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A new method of deriving comparative statics information using generalized compensated deriva-
tives is presented which yields constraint-free semidefiniteness results for any differentiable, con-
strained optimization problem. More generally, it applies to any differentiable system governed
by an extremum principle, be it a physical system subject to the minimum action principle, the
equilibrium point of a game theoretical problem expressible as an extremum, or a problem of deci-
sion theory with incomplete information treated by the maximum entropy principle. The method
of generalized compensated derivatives is natural and powerful, and its underlying structure has a
simple and intuitively appealing geometric interpretation. Several extensions of the main theorem
such as envelope relations, symmetry properties and invariance conditions, transformations of deci-
sion variables and parameters, degrees of arbitrariness in the choice of comparative statics results,
and rank relations and inequalities are developed. These extensions lend considerable power and
versatility to the new method as they broaden the range of available analytical tools. Moreover, the
relationship of the new method to existing formulations is established, thereby providing a unifica-
tion of the main differential comparative statics methods currently in use. A second, more general
theorem is also established which yields exhaustive, constraint-free comparative statics results for
a general, constrained optimization problem. Because of its universal and maximal nature, this
theorem subsumes all other comparative statics formulations and as such represents a significant
theoretical result. The method of generalized compensated derivatives is illustrated with a variety
of models, some well known, such as profit and utility maximization, where several novel extensions
and results are derived, and some new, such as the principal-agent problem, the efficient portfolio
problem, a model of a consumer with market power, and a cost-constrained profit maximization
model, where a number of interesting new results are derived and interpreted. The large arbitrari-
ness in the choice of generalized compensated derivatives and the associated comparative statics
results is explored and contrasted to the unique eigenvalue spectrum whence all comparative statics
results originate. The significance of this freedom in facilitating empirical verification and hypoth-
esis testing is emphasized and demonstrated by means of familiar economic models. Conceptual
clarity and intuitive understanding are emphasized throughout the paper, and particular attention
is paid to the underlying geometry of the problems being analyzed.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Re´sume´ of Current Methods
Ever since Cournot (1838) proved that a profit maximizing monopoly would reduce its output and raise its price
in response to an increase in the unit tax on its output, economic theorists have sought to examine the comparative
statics properties of economic theories. The epitome of such comparative statics occurred in 1886 with Antonelli and
in 1915 with Slutsky, when they independently showed that the comparative statics properties of the archetype utility
maximization model are summarized in a negative semidefinite matrix, now known as the Antonelli and Slutsky
matrices, respectively. But it was not until the publication of Samuelson’s (1947) dissertation that comparative
statics became part of the economist’s tool kit. Samuelson (1947), building upon the pioneering work of Allen (1938),
Hicks (1939), and others, formulated the following strategy for deriving comparative statics results associated with
optimization problems: (i) assume the second-order sufficient conditions hold at the optimal solution and apply the
implicit function theorem to the first-order necessary conditions to characterize the optimal choice functions, (ii)
differentiate the identity form of the first-order necessary conditions with respect to the parameter of interest, and
(iii) solve the resulting linear system of comparative static equations. This primal approach is indicative of most
comparative statics analyses in economics to this day, and provides the general framework within which subsequent
generalizations and refinements have been carried out. Indeed, despite several extensions of Samuelson’s (1947)
basic analysis by subsequent authors, the treatment of comparative statics in textbooks and monographs (with the
exception of Silberberg’s [1974] contributions, discussed below), as well as in most research work, essentially relies
on his original framework and for the most part ignores the subsequent developments. This circumstance is partly a
result of the desire for economy of presentation. But it is undoubtedly also a consequence of the fact that none of
the later extensions and generalizations of Samuelson’s (1947) basic framework succeeded in arriving at a completely
general, constraint-free semidefiniteness result involving the partial derivatives of the decision variables with respect
to the parameters for the case of a constrained optimization problem. In fact the existing literature does not really
contemplate the general existence of such an unrestricted result [see Silberberg, (1990)].
Our objective in this paper is to show that such a general result in fact exists, that the formalism for its construction
is natural and grounded in intuition, and that the comparative statics results derived from it are sufficiently broad and
powerful as to render it a worthwhile tool accessible to most economists. Indeed only one extra conceptual ingredient
beyond Samuelson’s (1947) basic framework is needed in its construction, namely a clear understanding of the role of
compensated derivatives in formulating a general comparative statics statement. This understanding in turn leads to
a recipe for identifying a suitable class of compensated derivatives in terms of which the unrestricted semidefiniteness
result for a general optimization problem is realized. Before delving into details, however, it is appropriate to briefly
review a few highlights of the progress since Samuelson’s (1947) seminal work, partly with a view to the concepts
and methods presented in this paper. It is also appropriate at this point to recall that the standard definition of
definiteness or semidefiniteness for a matrix, to which we shall adhere, requires symmetry as a prerequisite (see §IIB
for a definition).
Some twenty seven years after its inception, Samuelson’s (1947) primal method was significantly advanced and en-
riched by a new formulation of the problem. Silberberg (1974), building upon the work of Samuelson (1965), brought
about the change by means of a clever construction that in retrospect seems quite natural. By changing one’s view-
point of the optimization problem, that is, by simultaneously considering the set of parameters and choice variables of
the original, primal problem as choice variables, Silberberg (1974) set up an excess optimization problem that simulta-
neously contained the primal optimization problem together with a dual optimization problem, hence the appellation
primal-dual. Optimization of the primal-dual problem with respect to the original choice variables yields the primal
optimality conditions, while optimization with respect to the parameters yields the envelope properties of the primal
optimization problem as the first-order necessary conditions, and the fundamental comparative statics properties of
the primal optimization problem as the second-order necessary conditions. Undoubtedly, the most important feat
achieved by the introduction of the primal-dual method was the general construction of a semidefinite matrix that
contains the comparative statics properties of the primal optimization problem. The most significant shortcoming of
this method, on the other hand, is the fact that its final result is subject to constraints if the optimization problem
is constrained and the constraint functions depend on the parameters.
A few years later, Hatta (1980) introduced the gain method to deal with a class of optimization problems that
are essentially a nonlinear, multi-constraint generalization of the Slutsky-Hicks (basic utility maximization) problem.
For unconstrained problems, the gain method is identical to the primal-dual method of Silberberg (1974). For
constrained problems, on the other hand, the gain method yields constraint-free comparative statics results for the
above-mentioned class of problems. This is accomplished by a procedure that amounts to applying the compensation
scheme used in the standard Slutsky-Hicks problem (cf. §IIC), albeit in a generalized form. Similarly, the method
avoids the use of Lagrange multipliers by a comparative scheme reminiscent of Silberberg’s (1974) primal-dual method,
3and in effect converts the constrained problem into an unconstrained one for the gain function. This procedure is in
essence equivalent to the standard multiplier method, differing only in the manner in which the auxiliary functions are
introduced. Otherwise, the flavor of the analysis with the gain method is similar to that of Silberberg’s (1974) primal-
dual method. Hatta’s (1980) work represents a significant advance since it succeeded in overcoming an important
shortcoming in the primal-dual method by deriving the first complete, constraint-free, comparative statics results for
the above-mentioned class of problems. However, it has not spurred further progress in the subject, nor has it gained
wide acceptance by workers in the field, primarily because its methods are not sufficiently general and lack a clear
conceptual basis.
The methods described above, and indeed most any other comparative statics analysis, rely upon the differentiability
of the primitives and solution functions of the optimization problem. The recent work of Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1994), on the other hand, breaks with that tradition of dealing with the local extrema
of differentiable functions. These authors, in contrast, develop an ordinal method for comparative statics, where
ordinality implies invariance with respect to order-preserving transformations. Milgrom and Roberts (1994) state the
following properties in defense of the ordinal method: (i) it dispenses with most of the smoothness assumptions of
the traditional methods, (ii) it is capable of dealing with multiple equilibria and finite parameter changes, and (iii) it
includes a theory of the robustness of conclusions with respect to assumptions. It is clear that the ordinal method is
intended to handle complications which lie outside the scope of differential comparative statics methodology. As such
the ordinal method is an essentially different, and in certain ways a complementary, approach to comparative statics.
Before closing this section, it is appropriate to briefly review the use of compensated derivatives in differentiable
comparative statics analysis. The interest in compensated comparative statics properties of economic models has its
genesis in the Slutsky matrix of compensated derivatives of the Marshallian (or ordinary) demand functions. Research
on compensated comparative statics properties of general optimization problems, however, is of a more recent origin.
The best known contribution of this ilk is a set of three papers by Kalman and Intriligator (1973), and Chichilnisky and
Kalman (1977, 1978), which introduced generalizations that actually predated the methods described above, albeit
within a restricted framework. In particular, these authors emphasized the significance of compensated derivatives
in the context of a general class of constrained optimization problems and established the existence of a generalized
Slutsky-Hicks matrix for such problems. However, they did not succeed in establishing the crucial semidefiniteness
properties of this matrix in general. Perhaps because their analysis was primarily concerned with establishing the
existence of solutions using essentially primal methods, and because their comparative statics results were restricted
to special forms, their work was largely superseded by subsequent developments. Similarly, their construction and
use of compensated derivatives, although a significant advance toward a general method of dealing with constraints,
was rendered in the same limited context and was not much pursued by others.
The last contribution to be mentioned here is the work of Houthakker (1951-52) which, while perhaps not as well
recognized as the other post-Samuelsonian contributions mentioned above, actually predates them. In an attempt to
quantify the role of quality in consumer demand, Houthakker (1951-52) clearly recognized the important role played
by compensated derivatives, the large number of ways in which they can be constructed, and how they are related
to a differential characterization of the constraints present in the problem, albeit in the context of specific examples.
However, he only succeeded in deriving the desired semidefiniteness condition for a restricted class of problems, and
his contribution did not lead to any significant development in the subject.
B. Generalized Compensated Derivatives
As mentioned before, the method presented here is based on the pivotal role played by compensated derivatives,
and in effect unifies and generalizes the above-described formulations. As is often the case, this generalization leads
to a conceptually simpler structure, while yielding a powerful method of deriving constraint-free comparative statics
results. The basic idea originates in the observation that the natural parameters of a given optimization problem are
not necessarily the most advantageous variables for formulating comparative statics results. This is plainly obvious
in the Slutsky-Hicks problem where a linear combination of derivatives in the form of a compensated derivative must
be employed in order to obtain the desired semidefiniteness properties. On the other hand, a linear combination of
partial derivatives is, aside from an inessential scale factor, simply a directional derivative pointed in some direction
in parameter space. Since an uncompensated (i.e., a partial) derivative is also a directional derivative, albeit a very
particular one pointed along one of the coordinate axes in parameter space, it follows that the distinction between
the two is merely a matter of the choice of coordinates in parameter space and has no intrinsic standing. Indeed a
local rotation in parameter space, i.e., a rotation whose magnitude and direction may vary from point to point, can
interchange the role of the two. Such a rotation is of course equivalent to adopting a new set of parameters for the
optimization problem, suitably constructed as functions of the original ones. Clearly then, any general formulation of
differential comparative statics must consider the possibility of choosing from this vastly enlarged class of directional
4derivatives in parameter space.
The question that arises at this juncture is whether there exists a universal criterion for choosing the compensated
derivatives so as to guarantee the desired semidefiniteness properties free of constraints, and without requiring any
restriction on the structure of the optimization problem. Remarkably, and in retrospect not surprisingly, there is a
simple and natural answer to this question. One simply chooses the compensated derivatives in conformity with the
constraint conditions, i.e., along directions that are tangent to the level surfaces of all the constraint functions at
each point of the parameter space (for a given value of the decision variables). Equivalently, acting on the constraint
functions, the compensated derivatives are required to return zero at all points of parameter space (for a given value
of the decision variables). This requirement is in effect the ab initio, differential implementation of the constraints,
as will become clear in the course of the following analysis. What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is that this
procedure yields an operationally powerful, yet intuitively palatable framework that is capable of yielding varied and
novel results, even in the case of unconstrained problems.
Before embarking upon the following development, it is worth identifying its main elements. The cornerstone
of the analysis is Lemma 1 in §IIA, the main mathematical device is the generalized compensated derivative, also
developed in §IIA, and the principal result of the analysis is Theorem 1 in §IIB. This is followed by several auxiliary
developments and extensions, most of which are summarized in Theorem 2 and the Corollaries in §IIB and IIC. In §IID
we establish a maximal extension of Theorem 1, a theoretically important result which implies all other comparative
statics formulations. The method of generalized compensated derivatives is applied in §III to a number of models,
some old and several new, where its power and flavor are illustrated.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAIN RESULTS
This section is devoted to a detailed development of the main tools and results of the present method according
to the ideas described above. Because the underlying structure of this method is simple and natural, we find it
worthwhile to continue emphasizing the intuitive aspects of the analysis in the following development. It is our hope
that a clear conceptual grasp of its basics will encourage its use among a wider segment of economists.
A. Geometry of Generalized Compensation
To convey a clear picture of how the ideas described in §IB are implemented, we find it helpful to describe the
geometrical background involved in the construction of compensated derivatives in some detail. Let us first recall
certain basic results from analysis. Consider a real-valued, continuously differentiable function φ(x,a) defined for a
in some open subset P of <N and x in a subset D of <M . This function will later be identified with an objective
or constraint function, with the M -dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xM ) representing the decision variables in the
decision space, and the N -dimensional vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) representing a set of N parameters in the parameter
space . For most of this section, the dependence of φ on x plays a secondary role in the discussion, so that it is useful
to consider x as fixed and φ as a continuously differentiable function defined on an open subset P of <N . Throughout
the paper, we will symbolize vectors and matrices both in “vector” and “matrix” notation, as in v and M, and in
“component” notation, as in vi and Mij . The inner product of two vectors v and u is denoted by v · u def=
∑M
i=1viui.
For a pair of matrices M and N, the product is denoted by MN
def
=
∑M
j=1MijNjk. As for inner products between
vectors and matrices, Mv stands for the vector (column matrix)
∑M
j=1Mijvj , v
†M stands for the vector (row matrix)∑M
j=1vjMji, so that v
†Mu stands for the scalar
∑M
i,j=1viMijuj .
Given a fixed value of x, let a¯ be a point in P and S(a¯) the (N − 1)-dimensional level surface of φ passing through
a¯, that is, the set of points in P at which φ assumes the fixed value φ(x, a¯). In symbols, S(a¯) def= {a ∈ P : φ(x,a) =
φ(x, a¯)}. Then the gradient of φ with respect to a at point a¯, denoted by ∇aφ(x, a¯), is a vector normal to S(a¯) at a¯,
and represents the direction of most rapid change for φ at that point. We shall denote this vector by n(a¯)
def
= ∇aφ(x, a¯)
and its normalized version by nˆ(a¯)
def
= n(a¯)/‖n(a¯)‖, where ‖z‖ denotes the length of the vector z. On the other hand,
the hyperplane tangent to the level surface at a¯, denoted by I(a¯), is generated by the set of vectors that are tangent
to S(a¯) at point a¯, and represents the directions of no change for φ at a¯. Note that n(a¯) is orthogonal to I(a¯).
In plain language, then, the normal vector n(a¯) represents the direction of maximum change, whereas the tangent
hyperplane represents the directions of zero change, or the null directions. We shall refer to a vector in the tangent
hyperplane as an isovector. Thus an isovector is any vector that points in a null direction. Together, the isovectors
and the normal vector span all possible directions, thus providing a convenient local vector space at point a¯ of the
5parameter space. Figure 1 is an illustration of the structure just described in a three-dimensional parameter space,
with t1 and t2 depicting two isovectors in the tangent hyperplane I(a¯).
To define the geometric structure described above more generally, we first consider the vector space N (a¯) generated
by the normal vector n(a¯). While N (a¯) is a one-dimensional space in the present case, it will be generalized to higher
dimensions in more general situations later, and can therefore be referred to as the normal hyperplane in general.
Thus we have associated with each point a¯ of the parameter space a pair of orthogonal vector spaces N (a¯) and I(a¯),
the direct sum of which is the N -dimensional local vector space referred to above. We will denote the latter by T N (a¯),
and refer to it as the tangent space associated with point a¯. This construction implies, among other things, that any
real, N -dimensional vector can be uniquely resolved into a pair of components, one lying in the normal hyperplane
and the other in the tangent hyperplane.
If we now consider all points of P as endowed with the tangent space structure just described, there emerges a
configuration of local vector spaces covering all of P. In terms of these local spaces, the differential structure of φ is
essentially reduced to that of a function of one variable, namely the coordinate measured along the normal direction,
since at a given point a ∈ P, the derivative of φ along any direction lying in the tangent hyperplane vanishes. We
may summarize these results by saying that at every point a ∈ P, and for any direction specified by the (real, N -
dimensional) unit vector uˆ, (i) the decomposition uˆ = [uˆ · nˆ(a)]nˆ(a)+ut, where ut represents the projection of uˆ onto
the tangent hyperplane I(a), is unique, and (ii) the directional derivative of φ at point a in the direction uˆ is given by
Duˆφ(x,a)
def
= uˆ · ∇aφ(x,a) = uˆ · n(a). The last property implies that if uˆ points in a null direction, i.e., if uˆ ∈ I(a),
then the corresponding derivative vanishes: Duˆφ(x,a) = 0. We shall refer to this condition as the null property of a
directional derivative. Note that we have suppressed the dependence on a in Du to avoid cluttered notation. Note
also that the length of uˆ plays no role with respect to the null property, only the fact that it points in a null direction,
or, equivalently, that it is an isovector. Thus if t is an isovector of any length, then t · ∇aφ(x,a) = 0, so that t · ∇a
possesses the null property as well. Observe that t · ∇a is a linear combination of partial derivatives, equal to ‖t‖Dtˆ.
Since our primary focus is on the null property of this linear combination, we shall continue to (loosely) refer to t ·∇a
as a directional derivative, overlooking the inessential scalar factor ‖t‖ in doing so. We have thus arrived at the rather
obvious conclusion that any directional derivative of a function in the direction of one of its isovectors has the null
property with respect to that function.
This last property is the basis of our definition of compensated derivatives: Any linear combination of partial
derivatives possessing the null property with respect to a function φ is a generalized compensated derivative (hereafter
abbreviated as GCD) with respect to that function. To avoid trivialities, we shall exclude identically vanishing linear
combinations from this definition. Thus any directional derivative in a null direction is a GCD, with the converse
also holding except where ∇aφ(x,a) vanishes. As an example, consider the case illustrated in Fig. 1 where t1 and t2
depict a pair of isovectors at point a¯, which is located on the level surface S(a¯) of φ(x,a). For this case, then, the
directional derivatives t1 · ∇a and t2 · ∇a are a pair of GCD’s with respect to φ(x,a). Their null property, on the
other hand, is seen in Fig. 1to reflect the simple fact that the rate of change of a function is zero in directions tangent
to its level surface. Moreover, the reason for making the null property a defining characteristic is the crucial fact that,
when the GCD’s possess this property with respect to the constraint functions, the resulting semidefiniteness results
emerge free of constraints. This basic result will be established in this and the following sections.
Although our construction has so far been limited to a one-dimensional normal hyperplane, we shall consider higher-
dimensional normal hyperplanes in dealing with illustrative problems, where expressions involving the normal vectors
∇aφ(x,a) and nˆ will be generalized to include a set of such vectors. Otherwise, the geometrical features discussed
above, including the decomposition into normal and tangent components, remain unchanged.
Let us illustrate the construction of GCD’s by means of four basic economic problems. All but the third assume
perfect information and are thus deterministic, while the third problem involves uncertainty as well as asymmetry of
information between the transacting parties. In the first problem, the function φ is given by φ(x,a)
def
= m − p · x,
where p, x ∈ <N−1+ , and x is a fixed vector here. This is of course the generic form of the budget constraint
that appears in the prototype utility maximization problem. Here the variables of interest are the N parameters
appearing in φ, identified according to a = (a1, . . . , aN )
def
= (p1, . . . , pN−1,m) = (p,m). Then the normal direction is
given by ∇aφ(x,a) = (−x, 1). Next, we must choose a set of N − 1 vectors, all orthogonal to the normal direction
just calculated, as a basis for the tangent hyperplane. A convenient choice is the set tα
def
= (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0, xα),
α = 1, . . . , N − 1, where the component equal to unity occupies the αth position within the parenthesis. Note that
these basis vectors are neither mutually orthogonal nor of unit length, but that they are all orthogonal to the gradient
vector and constitute an independent set in the tangent hyperplane. Clearly, each tα is an isovector, so that the set
of directional derivatives formed by taking the inner product tα · ∇a def= Dα(x,a) possesses the desired null property
with respect to φ and is therefore a set of N −1 GCD’s. Note that we have made the dependence of the GCD’s on the
points x of the decision space and a of parameter space explicit in our notation, a practice which we shall henceforth
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FIG. 1. An illustration of the tangent plane and normal direction in a 3-dimensional parameter space. Isovectors t1 and t2 are
a pair of independent vectors on the tangent plane.
7follow. Remembering that here ∇a = ( ∂∂p1 , . . . , ∂∂pN−1 , ∂∂m ), one can easily derive the result Dα(x,a) = ∂∂pα + xα ∂∂m .
The latter is of course the compensated derivative that appears in the Slutsky-Hicks problem. It is worth noting here
that (for N ≥ 3) any linear combination of Dα(x,a) will again yield a GCD. This fact corresponds to the infinite
number of ways one can choose N − 1 independent basis vectors in I(a) when N ≥ 3, and already gives a hint of
the generality of the present method, and as well of the diversity of the results it can generate. It is also worth
noting here that the procedure described above and applied to this problem is not the only available method for
constructing GCD’s, but one that reveals the underlying geometry most explicitly. Thus any procedure that yields
a set of directional derivatives with the null property and such that the corresponding directions in the parameter
space span the tangent hyperplane will suffice. Taking advantage of this freedom, we will in the following sections
introduce simplified procedures for constructing the set of GCD’s for various applications.
While the above treatment illustrates the construction of a GCD for a constrained problem in the context of a
well known model, our second problem will deal with an unconstrained model and will give an indication of the
calculational novelty of the present method.
Consider φ˜(x,a)
def
= s[pF (x)−x ·w], where x,w ∈ <M+ . This φ˜ is, except for the presence of the scale factor s > 0,
the familiar function that describes the profit of a firm producing a single output from M inputs under conditions of
certainty and perfect competition; here x is the vector of inputs, F is a twice continuously differentiable production
function, p is the output price, and w is the vector of input prices. Clearly, since the scale factor s is stipulated to
be positive, its magnitude does not affect the optimal values of the decision variables under profit maximization, nor
does it have any effect on the comparative statics of the problem. In any case, s will be treated as a parameter whose
value will eventually be set equal to unity. It should be evident here that the scale factor serves an auxiliary purpose
in this calculation and has no other purpose, even though there are economically meaningful interpretations of its role
as will be discussed in §IIB.
Let the parameter set be identified as a = (a1, . . . , aM+2)
def
= (w1, w2, . . . , wM , p, s) = (w, p, s). Then ∇a =
( ∂∂w1 , . . . ,
∂
∂wM
, ∂∂p ,
∂
∂s ), so that we find ∇aφ˜(x,a) = (−sx, sF, φ), where φ(x,a)
def
= pF (x) − x · w is the standard
function describing the firm’s profit. Note that there are nowM+2 parameters under consideration, so thatN = M+2.
We can therefore choose the M + 1 isovectors according to tα
def
= (0, 0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0, 0, sxαφ ), α = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where
the component equal to unity occupies the αth position within the parenthesis, and tM+1
def
= (0, . . . , 0, 1,−sFφ ). The
corresponding set of compensated derivatives is easily found to be Dα(x,a) =
∂
∂wα
+ ( sxαφ )
∂
∂s , α = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and
DM+1(x,a) =
∂
∂p − sFφ ∂∂s . Note that each Dα(x,a) has the null property with respect to φ˜. Therefore these M + 1
directional derivatives constitute a set of GCD’s for this problem and will be used in §IIIA to derive certain novel
comparative statics results for the standard profit maximization model.
It is appropriate at this juncture to emphasize an important feature of GCD’s briefly mentioned earlier. While the
customary meaning of compensation refers to a correction term that accounts for the effect of a constraint in the
problem, the archetypical example being the correction for the income effect in the utility maximization problem, no
necessary connection with constraints is implied in the case of generalized compensation, as is clearly illustrated in
the profit maximization case treated above. Indeed any problem, constrained or not, will admit the use of generalized
compensation if its parameter space is larger than one-dimensional. Furthermore, as the introduction of the scale
parameter s for the problem treated above shows, the parameter space can always be enlarged, so that the restriction
to more than one dimension is really no restriction at all.
The next problem to be considered here involves multiple constraints. It is therefore appropriate to first generalize
the notion of GCD’s to the case of a set of functions φk(x,a), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, K < N , each of which possesses the
properties ascribed to φ(x,a) in §IIA. To that end, consider a fixed value of x, and let a be a point in P. Then
the normal hyperplane N (a) is defined to be the vector space generated by the set of vectors nk(a) def= ∇aφk(x,a),
k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Note that in case the normal vectors constitute an independent set, i.e., if the only solution to∑K
k=1 c
knk(a) = 0, where every ck is a real number, is ck = 0 for all k, then the normal hyperplane will be K-
dimensional. The subset of the tangent space T N (a) orthogonal to N (a) is then the tangent hyperplane I(a) as
before. Note that when N (a) has dimension K, i.e., when dim[N (a)] = K, then dim[I(a)] = N −K. The case of
interest for economic problems usually corresponds to the condition dim[N (a)] = K (known in decision space as a
constraint qualification condition) with K < N . In any case, it should be emphasized here that what is needed for
the construction of GCD’s is an independent set of isovectors which can be characterized as a set of N − dim[N (a)]
independent, N -dimensional vectors each of which is orthogonal to nk(a) for every value of k. Clearly, there is no
need for an explicit construction of N (a) here.
Having established the generalization to the multiconstraint case, we now turn to the third problem illustrating the
construction of GCD’s. This is the principal-agent problem with hidden actions (also known as moral hazard) where
a firm, the principal, intends to hire an individual, the agent, to work on a certain venture on a contractual basis (see,
8e.g., Mas-Collel et al. 1995). We shall return to this problem in §IIIB, where we define and formulate the problem,
then show that it can be transformed to the following convenient form:
min x
∑M
i=1
xiPIi s.t. Bk −
∑M
i=1
v(xi)Pki = 0, sk −
∑M
i=1
Pki = 0, k = I, II,
Here Pki , where 0 < Pki < 1, i = 1, . . . ,M , k = I, II, is the probability that the ith profit level, pii, is realized
for the firm given that the agent performs at effort level k, with I and II corresponding to high and low effort
respectively. The decision variable xi, on the other hand, is the agent’s compensation in case the ith profit level is
realized. Furthermore, Bk
def
= ck+ u¯, where ck is the agent’s disutility of working at effort level k, u¯ is the market price
of the agent’s services, and v(x)− ck is the agent’s utility function. Finally, the parameters sk are a pair of positive
auxiliary variables which are introduced for calculational convenience and will eventually be set equal to unity. The
parameter set is thus identified as (Pki , Bk, sk), with i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and k = I, II, for a total of 2(M + 2), to be
eventually reduced to 2(M + 1) upon setting sk = 1.
Rather than following the procedure used in the other illustrative problems of this section, here we shall develop
an intuitive generalization of the GCD’s already constructed for the Slutsky-Hicks problem. We accomplish this in
two steps. In the first step, we note that for each value of k, the constraint Bk −∑Mi=1v(xi)Pki = 0 is analogous to a
budget constraint with Bk standing for income, v(xi) for the quantity of the ith good, and the probability Pki for the
price of that good. This analogy immediately gives us the two-term structure ∂/∂Pki + v(xi)∂/∂Bk, k = I, II which
is clearly compensated (i.e., possess the null property) with respect to the constraints involving Bk. The second step
is to amend this structure so as to extend the null property to the constraints involving sk. One can determine by
analogy and verify by inspection that the addition of ∂/∂sk to the above structure provides the desired extension of
the null property to the constraints involving sk without disturbing the same property with respect to the constraints
involving Bk. In short, the resulting structure, dki
def
= ∂/∂Pki + v(xi)∂/∂Bk + ∂/∂sk, has the required null property
with respect to all constraints. We can thus define
Dα(x,a)
def
= dIα, α = 1, 2, . . . ,M, Dα(x,a)
def
= dIIα−M , α = M + 1,M + 2, . . . , 2M,
as a set of GCD’s for our problem. We will use this set in §IIIB to derive comparative statics information for the
principal-agent problem.
The fourth problem to be considered here is that of the Pareto-optimal allocation of a given bundle of goods
to a number of individuals with given utility functions. We will treat this problem in full generality, primarily to
illustrate the method for a case with multiple, nontrivial constraints. We shall assume here an appropriate set of
regularity conditions (e.g., twice continuously differentiable, quasi-concave, strongly monotonic utility functions) such
that the desired optimality condition can be formulated as a maximization problem subject to multiple constraints.
Returning to the problem of allocating a resource bundle of G goods, ωi > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , G, to H individuals
in a Pareto-optimal manner, we consider maximizing u1(x1,b) by an appropriate choice of the variables xh ∈ <G+,
h = 1, 2, . . . ,H, or equivalently x ∈ <M+ , M = G × H, subject to a set of K = H − 1 + G constraints. These
constraints are φk(x,a)
def
= u¯k − uk(xk,b) = 0 for k = 2, 3, . . . ,H, and φk(x,a) def= ωk−H −
∑H
h=1x
h
k−H = 0 for
k = H + 1, H + 2, . . . ,H +G. Here uh(xh,b) is the utility function of the hth agent, b is a set of L parameters, and
u¯h is the fixed utility level of the hth agent. Moreover, the set of N = L+H−1+G parameters comprising the vector
a are identified as (b1, . . . , bL, u¯
2, . . . , u¯H , ω1, . . . , ωG). We shall assume as given a continuously differentiable, interior
solution to this maximization problem, and concern ourselves with the construction of the GCD’s for the problem.
As a first step in the construction of the GCD’s, we consider the H − 1 + G normal vectors with components
∂φk(x,a)/∂aα, α = 1, 2, . . . , L+H − 1 +G. For k = 2, 3, . . . ,H, these components are given by −∂uk(xk,b)/∂bα for
α = 1, 2, . . . , L, by δα,L+k−1 for α = L+1, L+2, . . . , L+H−1, and they vanish for α = L+H,L+H+1, . . . , L+H−1+G.
For k = H+1, H+2, . . . ,H+G, the components of the normal vectors vanish for α = 1, 2, . . . , L+H−1, and are equal
to δk−1,α−L for α = L+H,L+H+1, . . . , L+H−1+G. We can compactly rewrite these expressions as ∇aφk(x,a) =
[−∇buk(xk,b), ek−1H−1,0] for k = 2, 3, . . . ,H, and ∇aφk(x,a) = [0,0, ek−HG ] for k = H + 1, H + 2, . . . ,H + G in a
shorthand notation where ejJ denotes a J-dimensional unit vector pointing in the jth direction. The next step is the
construction of a set of isovectors tα. There will be L of these if the normal vectors are independent, which is the typical
situation and will be assumed to be the case here. As in the case of the previous models, we can construct these by
inspection. For example, we can choose, for α = 1, . . . , L, tα
def
= [eαL,
∂
∂bα
u2(x2,b), ∂∂bαu
3(x3,b), . . . , ∂∂bαu
H(xH ,b),0].
The set of L compensated derivatives corresponding to the isovector set just constructed can be expressed as
Dα(x,a) = t
α · ∇a = ∂∂bα +
∑H
h=2[
∂
∂bα
uh(xh,b)] ∂
∂u¯h
, α = 1, 2, . . . , L. As usually formulated, the general Pareto-
optimal allocation problem yields multiple solutions (the Pareto set). Consequently, additional conditions must be
imposed in order to render the solution unique and comparative statics questions meaningful. Once this is done, the
9GCD set constructed above can be used to derive constraint-free comparative statics results for the Pareto-optimal
allocation problem according to Eq. (7) of §IIB in a straightforward manner. Note that this GCD set does not
involve the parameters ωi, and that we would have arrived at the same GCD’s had we elected not to include the
ω’s in the parameter set in the first place. This is so since in any event the partial derivatives with respect to the
remaining parameters b and u¯k annihilate the resource constraint equations, i.e., they are already “compensated”
with respect to the latter. This will always occur if (a) certain parameters are the only ones appearing in certain
constraint equations, and (b) those parameters do not appear in any other constraint equations. Note also that the
GCD’s just constructed were not compensated with respect to the objective function, i.e., Dα(x,a)u
1(x1,b) does not
vanish by construction. As we will show below, this property is not needed for obtaining constraint-free comparative
statics results. The fact that this property was incorporated into the profit maximization problem treated above, on
the other hand, was simply motivated by the calculational power that generalized compensation makes available for
deriving various comparative statics results, as will be demonstrated in §IIC and in the applications.
Having demonstrated the construction of GCD’s for four basic economic models, we now resume the main develop-
ment and proceed to establish the most important property of a GCD, namely its constraint conformance property
mentioned earlier. To that end, we start by reversing the roles of x and a, consider the latter as fixed, and proceed to
apply the construction developed above in parameter space to decision space. In particular, an isovector s in decision
space is an M -dimensional vector which is orthogonal to all the normal directions associated with the set φk(x,a),
i.e., s · ∇xφk(x,a) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. If, moreover, some of the functions in the set, say those corresponding to
k = 1, . . . , C, with C ≤ K, serve as constraint functions by virtue of the requirement that they must equal zero, then
the corresponding isovectors in decision space are precisely those that conform to the constraints by virtue of pointing
in directions that are tangent to the level surfaces defined by the constraints in decision space. The isovectors in de-
cision space are therefore conforming vectors in this sense, and for that reason play a crucial role in the construction
of the matrix that conveys constraint-free comparative statics results.
To make these assertions more transparent, let us now consider a restriction of the above constructions in the
decision and parameter spaces to the case where the two vector arguments of the functions φk(x,a) are functionally
related. Specifically, let x be a continuously differentiable function of a, i.e., x = x(a), and consider the restricted
set of functions φk(x(a),a). In applications, the vector-valued function x(·), which we shall refer to as a decision
function, is derived from some optimality condition, subject to constraints if present. Such a constraint condition
therefore implies that φk(x(a),a) = 0 for k = 1, 2, . . . , C and a in some subset of P. In other words, when restricted
to x = x(a), each function in the constraint set identically vanishes in the variable a. To exploit this property, let
us apply the now restricted parameter space GCD’s Dα(x(a),a), henceforth abbreviated by Dα(a), to the constraint
identities. The result is that for all a ∈ P and k = 1, . . . , C,
0 = Dα(a)φ
k(x(a),a) =
∑M
i=1
φk,i(x(a),a)xi;α(a) + φ
k
;α(x(a),a),
where φk,i(x,a)
def
= ∂∂xiφ
k(x,a), xi;α(a)
def
= Dα(a)xi(a) = t
α · ∇axi(a), and φk;α(x,a) def= Dα(a)φk(x,a). However,
owing to the null property of the GCD’s, the second term on the right hand side of the above equations vanishes,
leaving behind the term involving the compensated derivatives of the decision functions. Note the appearance of
decision space normal vectors φk,i(x,a) in the surviving term of the above equation. Also note the introduction of
a notational convention here whereby a subscript occurring to the right of a comma signifies partial differentiation,
whereas a subscript occurring to the right of a semicolon signifies directional differentiation corresponding to a GCD.
Moreover, Latin subscripts are used to denote differentiation with respect to decision variables, while Greek indices
are used for differentiation in parameter space.
The surviving term in the last-stated equation above is in fact the inner product of xi;α(a) with decision space
normal vectors φk,i(x,a), so that its vanishing for every value of k and α implies the orthogonality of every generalized
compensated derivative of x(a) to every normal vector associated with the constraint surfaces in decision space.
Equivalently, the stated orthogonality implies the tangency of xi;α(a) to the decision space surface φ
k(x,a) = 0
(with a fixed) for every value of α and k. We have thus established the fact that the application of parameter space
GCD’s to the decision functions produces isovectors in decision space, i.e., vectors that conform to the constraints.
It is useful to examine more closely how this crucial property of GCD’s emerges. Because the restricted constraint
functions φk(x(a),a) vanish identically in a, and since a “small” change δa
def
= tα which points in a null direction tα
induces no variation in φk(x(a),a) arising from its dependence on the second argument, there cannot be any variation
arising from the change in the first argument, tα · ∇ax(a), either. But the last statement characterizes tα · ∇ax(a)
as an isovector in decision space. Recalling that tα · ∇a def= Dα(a), we arrive at the desired result. This is the most
important property of a GCD and, under the conditions stipulated above, may be summarized as
Lemma 1. Every generalized compensated derivative of a decision function conforms to the constraints in decision
space.
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We pause here to emphasize the profoundly dual nature of this result, as is already evident in the arguments
preceding the statement of the lemma: a directional derivative which annihilates the constraint functions in parameter
space, when applied to decision functions, will produce a vector which conforms to the constraints in decision space.
B. The Main Theorems
Having described the construction and properties of GCD’s in the previous section in some detail, we are now in a
position to establish the main theorem of this paper. Consider the optimization problem
max x f(x,a) s.t. g
k(x,a) = 0, (1)
where f, gk are twice continuously differentiable with k = 1, 2, . . . ,K and M,N > K. As stipulated above, x and a
are points in decision and parameter spaces, respectively. To avoid trivialities, we shall furthermore require the set
of constraint functions to be independent at the optimum point. This requirement implies that the set of parameter
space normal vectors is linearly independent and the parameter space normal hyperplane is of dimension K at the
optimum point. It is a simple matter to show that this requirement also implies a parallel condition in decision space,
the well known constraint qualification condition.
The task before us now is the establishment of the comparative statics corresponding to a given solution of the
above problem. To that end, let us suppose there exists a unique, continuously differentiable, interior solution to the
above problem specified by the (vector-valued) decision function x(a). In other words, we suppose the existence of an
open set P in parameter space and a set D in decision space together with a continuously differentiable function x(·)
from P to D such that for each value of a ∈ P, the point x(a) is in the interior of D and possesses the constrained
maximum property stated in Eq. (1). Note that we have not included any inequality constraints, such as those arising
from nonnegativity conditions imposed on decision variables, in Eq. (1) since the interior nature of the solution in
effect obviates any such conditions.
In order to characterize the constrained maximum property of x(a), we construct a set of GCD’s with respect to
the constraint functions given in Eq. (1), possibly including the objective function as well, according to the procedure
explained in §IIA. It is also useful to introduce the notation h(a) def= ∑Aα=1ηαx;α(a), where ηα is an arbitrary vector
of real numbers, A is the number of GCD’s, and x;α(a) = t
α · ∇ax(a) = Dα(a)x(a) using the notation established in
§IIA. According to Lemma 1 established above, x;α(a) conforms to the constraints in decision space for every value of
α. But then the same is implied for h(a), since it is a linear combination of conforming vectors (recall that conforming
vectors are elements of a linear space, the tangent hyperplane in decision space). By construction, then, the vector
h(a) conforms to the constraints.
Using the above construction, we can use the maximum condition stated in (1) to assert that for any  of sufficiently
small magnitude, we have the condition
f(x(a) + h(a),a) ≤ f(x(a),a), (2)
a statement that holds free of constraints. But then the arbitrary sign of  in Eq. (2) can be used in conjunction
with the differentiability property of f to deduce that the directional derivative of f in the direction of h(a) must be
nonpositive as well as nonnegative, hence the result that it must vanish;∑M
i=1
hi(a)f,i(x(a),a) = 0, (3)
Eq. (3) is the constraint-free, necessary, first-order condition implied by the constrained maximum property stated in
Eq. (1).
We next explore the consequences of the first-order condition just derived. This condition simply characterizes
f,i(x(a),a) as being orthogonal to the tangent hyperplane in decision space, hence as belonging to the normal hy-
perplane in decision space. But the last statement implies that, for each value of a, the gradient vector f,i(x(a),a)
may be expressed as a linear combination of the normal vectors to the constraint surfaces in decision space. Since the
latter are simply given by the gradients of the constraint functions in decision space, we find
f,i(x(a),a)
def
= −
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,i(x(a),a). (4)
The scalars λk that enter the linear combination on the right hand side of Eq. (4) are of course the familiar multipliers
of Lagrange’s method of constrained maximization (with the negative sign inserted for convenience).
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Thus far we have essentially established the validity of Lagrange’s method for dealing with constrained optimization
problems using our construction. Having established that connection, we now recall the second-order, necessary con-
ditions associated with the maximization problem of Eq. (1) (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Takayama 1985). That
condition states that for any conforming vector l, i.e., any vector l which satisfies the condition
∑M
i=1lig
k
,i(x(a),a) = 0
for every value of k, we have the inequality∑M
i,j=1
lilj [f,ij(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,ij(x(a),a)] ≤ 0. (5)
Since in the present instance the vector h(a) conforms to the constraints by construction, Eq. (5) would hold free
of constraints if h(a) is substituted for l. Recalling that h(a) is equal to
∑A
α=1ηαx;α(a), and remembering that the
vector of real numbers ηα appearing therein is arbitrary, we recognize in Eq. (5) the statement that the matrix
Ωαβ(a)
def
= −
∑M
i,j=1
xi;α(a)xj;β(a)[f,ij(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,ij(x(a),a)]
is positive semidefinite. The symmetry property of Ω is a consequence of the symmetry of f,ij(x(a),a) and g
k
,ij(x(a),a),
the latter following from the symmetry of the matrix of second-order partial derivatives for twice continuously dif-
ferentiable functions. Let us recall here that a real matrix A is by definition positive definite or semidefinite if (a)
it is symmetric and (b) for every real vector v 6= 0, the quadratic form v†Av is positive definite or semidefinite
respectively.
The above expression for Ω can be rewritten by first applying a GCD, say Dα(a), to Eq. (4), obtaining∑M
j=1
[f,ij(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,ij(x(a),a)]xj;α(a) =
−[f,i;α(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,i;α(x(a),a)]−
∑K
k=1
λk;α(a)g
k
,i(x(a),a). (6)
If Eq. (6) is now multiplied by xi;β and summed over i, the second term on the right hand side vanishes by the
conformance property of xi;β that follows from Lemma 1 of §IIA, leaving a simplified expression for Ω:
Ωαβ(a) =
∑M
i=1
xi;β(a)[f,i;α(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,i;α(x(a),a)]. (7)
It is appropriate to recall here that the semidefiniteness property of Ω implies that it is symmetric, i.e., Ωαβ(a) =
Ωβα(a), a fact that we have already used in writing Eq. (7) and will continue to utilize throughout this work. We
have thus arrived at the result that the matrix Ω, which is a linear combination of the partial derivatives of the
decision functions with respect to the parameters, is positive semidefinite, free of constraints. We shall refer to a
matrix possessing these properties as a comparative statics matrix (or CSM in abbreviated form) for the optimization
problem. The unrestricted existence of a comparative statics matrix for a general, constrained optimization problem
is the central result of our analysis:
Theorem 1. The constrained optimization problem defined by Eq. (1) et seq. admits of a constraint-free comparative
statics matrix Ω given in Eq. (7).
It is worth reemphasizing here that there is a large freedom of choice in the construction of CSM’s, a feature that
will be explored in the following and summarized in Theorem 2. While this freedom may be exploited to generate
different forms of comparative statics for a given optimization problem, it is well to remember that all such matrices
convey no more information than is contained in the second-order, necessary conditions expressed in Eq. (5). These
conditions in turn originate in the local concavity of the underlying constrained maximization problem defined in
Eq. (1). A more intuitive discussion of these and related matters will be given at the end of §IIC.
Having established the main result of this paper, we now proceed to discuss how such features as the envelope and
homogeneity properties are realized in the present framework. We will then consider the nonuniqueness features of
our construction and develop a characterization of the associated arbitrariness in the resulting CSM’s.
As one might surmise, the null property of our GCD’s ensures that the envelope property holds for the general
constrained optimization problem defined by Eq. (1) as a property of the optimized objective function and without
the intrusion of constraint functions. To see this explicitly, let us start by introducing the value function V (a)
def
=
f(x(a),a), and observe that it is also equal to f(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1λk(a)g
k(x(a),a) by the identical vanishing of the
restricted constraint functions for all a ∈ P. Next consider the result of applying a GCD, say Dα(a), to the value
function as given by the second expression above. Then, using Eq. (4) and the null property gk;α(x(a),a) = 0, we find
the desired result that Dα(a)V (a) = V;α(a) = f;α(x(a),a), which is a statement of the envelope property in terms
of GCD’s. Note that in case the GCD’s have the (optional) null property with respect to the objective function,
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i.e., if f;α(x(a),a) = 0, then the envelope property reduces to the statement that V;α(a) = 0, i.e., that the value
function also possesses the null property. In other words, if the the null property of the GCD’s is extended to to the
objective function, then the value function has vanishing derivatives in the null directions tα. Note that this condition
is equivalent to a set of A first-order partial differential equations satisfied by the value function. Needless to say,
each of these is an invariance property of the value function.
Next we explore the consequences of any useful symmetry, or invariance property that the objective and constraint
functions might possess. Consider the optimization problem defined by Eq. (1), together with the assumed solution
x(a), with a ∈ P. The task before us is to find out how a given invariance possessed by the objective and constraint
functions of this problem, such as homogeneity of a given degree, gives rise to a corresponding property of the decision
functions. To that end, let us start by characterizing the class of symmetries we would like to consider, limiting our
attention to those invariances that are likely to play a significant role in economic applications.
Suppose there exist a pair of real, continuously differentiable vector functions X(x) and A(a), from D and P to
<M and <N respectively, and consider the differential operator J defined by
J(x,a)
def
=
∑M
i=1
Xi(x)
∂
∂xi
+
∑N
µ=1
Aµ(a)
∂
∂aµ
.
Suppose further that the action of J on the objective and constraint functions can be described by suitable functions,
that is,
J(x,a)f(x,a) = F(f(x,a)),
J(x,a)gk(x,a) = Gk(gk(x,a)), k = 1, . . . ,K, (8)
for every x ∈ D and a ∈ P. Here F and Gk are continuously differentiable functions from <1 to <1, with Gk(0) = 0,
k = 1, . . . ,K.
These conditions, obscure as they may appear, actually have a straightforward interpretation as invariance condi-
tions. They essentially state that if the objective and constraint functions are evaluated at the “slightly” displaced
values of their arguments x + J(x,a)x = x + X(x) and a + J(x,a)a = a + A(a), instead of x and a respec-
tively, where  is a “small” real number, then the underlying optimization problem remains unchanged to first order
in . Given a suitable uniqueness requirement on the solution function x(a), this first-order invariance condition
would imply that the modified objective and constraint functions define a solution that differs from the solution of
the original problem only by quantities of second order in . In other words, they imply that the decision vector
x(a) + X(x) differs from the solution x(a + A(a)) by second-order quantities only (Euclidean norm implied). The
last statement can then be converted into the following invariance property for x(a) in the limit of vanishing :
Xi(x(a))−
∑N
µ=1Aµ(a)xi,µ(a) = 0.
The heuristic argument given in the foregoing paragraph can be formalized in a straightforward manner. To do
so, we start with the assumed invariance conditions obeyed by the objective and constraint functions, Eqs. (8), and
proceed to differentiate these with respect to the decision variables. The result for the objective function is∑M
i=1
[Xi,j(x)f,i(x,a) +Xi(x)f,ij(x,a)] +
∑N
µ=1
Aµ(a)f,µj(x,a) = F
′(f(x,a))f,j(x,a),
where a prime signifies differentiation with respect to the argument. A similar equation results for each constraint
function gk. Next we multiply the resulting equation for gk by λk, sum this over k, and add the result to the
above equation for f in order to obtain an equation involving the partial derivatives of the combination f(x) +∑K
k=1λkg
k(x,a)
def
= L(x,a), the Lagrange function associated with the optimization problem. Here, as elsewhere in
this paper, the dependence of L on the multipliers has been suppressed to avoid clutter in the notation. Since only
partial derivatives of L with respect to x and a will appear in our notation, the suppression of λ should not cause any
confusion. Restricting the resulting equation for L to the solution of the optimization problem by substituting x(a)
for x and using the first-order condition given in Eq. (4), we find∑M
i=1
Xi(x(a))L,ij(x(a),a) +
∑N
µ=1
Aµ(a)L,µj(x(a),a) =
−
∑K
k=1
λkg
k
,j(x(a),a)[F
′(f(x(a),a))−Gk′(gk(x(a),a)]
Similarly, restricting the assumed invariance condition for gk to the solution x = x(a), we find
∑M
i=1Xi(x(a))g
k
,i(x(a),a)+∑N
µ=1Aµ(a)g
k
,µ(x(a),a) = 0. On the other hand, a differentiation of the kth constraint equation with respect to aµ
13
leads to gk,µ(x(a),a) +
∑M
i=1g
k
,i(x(a),a)xi,µ(a) = 0. Eliminating g
k
,µ(x(a),a) from the last two equations, we get∑M
i=1
Zi(a)g
k
,i(x(a),a) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K,
where Z(a)
def
= X(x(a)) −∑Nµ=1Aµ(a)x,µ(a). Note that the relation just derived is an orthogonality condition in
decision space which identifies Z as a conforming vector. If the equation derived above for L is multiplied by Zj and
summed over j, we find, taking account of the conformance property of Z, the result∑M
i,j=1
Xi(x(a))L,ij(x(a),a)Zj(a) +
∑M
j=1
∑N
µ=1
Aµ(a)L,µj(x(a),a)Zj(a) = 0.
To develop this equation further, we differentiate the first-order condition given in Eq. (4) with respect to aµ and use
the conformance property of Z to rewrite the term
∑M
j=1
∑N
µ=1Aµ(a)L,µj(x(a),a)Zj(a) as−
∑M
i,j=1
∑N
µ=1Aµ(a)L,ij(x(a),a)xi,µ(a)Zj(a).
Finally, using this last relation in the equation for L, we arrive at the result∑M
i,j=1
Zi(a)L,ij(x(a),a)Zj(a) = 0. (9)
It is at this point that a local uniqueness condition must be imposed on the solution x(a) to insure the desired
invariance property. To avoid inessential technical complications, we will assume here that the matrix L,ij is negative
definite, a condition which is sufficient but not necessary. While it is common practice in textbook expositions to make
this assumption throughout, we have only relied on the semidefiniteness of L,ij elsewhere in this paper. Given the
stronger assumption then, we immediately conclude from Eq. (9) that Z must vanish, a conclusion which is equivalent
to the invariance property we arrived at heuristically before [and incorporated in Theorem 2 as Eq. (16)].
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this invariance result, let us consider how it applies to the case of homogeneity,
or scale invariance properties. Suppose the objective and constraint functions of a given optimization problem satisfy
the invariance conditions given in Eqs. (8) with X(x) = ηx and A(a) = a. Then, according to Eq. (16), the solution
to this problem will satisfy the invariance condition
∑N
µ=1aµxi,µ(a) = ηxi(a). This last condition characterizes
x(a) as a homogeneous function of degree η (via Euler’s Theorem). As an example of this, consider the problem of
utility maximization treated in §IIA, where the underlying symmetry resides in the fact that a uniform inflation or
deflation in income and all the prices has no effect on the consumption bundle demanded. Formally, this symmetry
corresponds to the fact that the invariance conditions given in Eqs. (8) are satisfied by the objective (utility) and
constraint (budget constraint) functions of the problem with X(x) = 0 and A(a) = a, hence η = 0. This characterizes
the decision function as homogeneous of degree zero, in full harmony with the underlying symmetry; in symbols,∑N−1
µ=1 pµ
∂
∂pµ
x(p,m) + m ∂∂mx(p,m) = 0. An even simpler case of scale invariance is one which we have already
exploited, namely the introduction and use of the scale parameter s in the basic profit maximization model in §IIA.
This invariance can be interpreted in several economically meaningful ways. For example, one can consider the
fact that the amount of revenues minus expenditures being maximized in that model may be expressed in various
multiples of a given currency, or even in different currencies, and this should have no effect on the decision functions.
Alternatively, one might interpret 1 − s > 0 as a flat tax rate on profits and the objective function as the net profit
of the firm, which again has no effect on the decision functions. Mathematically, on the other hand, one chooses
X(x) = 0 and A(a) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, s), so that J(x,a) = s∂/∂s and η = 0. Then the invariance conditions in Eqs. (8)
are satisfied, and (with s 6= 0) we have the result that ∂x(a)/∂s = 0, the obvious result. Other examples of the use
of Eq. (16) will be considered in the applications.
Having dealt with the envelope and symmetry properties of the optimization problem defined by Eq. (1), we now
proceed to study several structural features of Ω, the general CSM constructed for that problem. The first question
concerns the definiteness of Ω, or more specifically, whether its rank is lower than its order, and if so, whether there
exists an upper bound on this rank. Let us recall that we are dealing with M decision variables, N parameters, K
(independent) constraints, and a CSM of order A ≤ N defined by [the equation preceding Eq. (6)]
Ωαβ(a)
def
= −
∑M
i,j=1
xi;α(a)xj;β(a)[f,ij(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,ij(x(a),a)].
The task before us is to establish an upper bound for the rank of this matrix. Let us first emphasize that an upper
bound is all that can in general be established, since the M × A matrix xi;α(a) that appears in the above equation
can have an arbitrarily small rank, including zero, implying the same for Ω. For example, for the optimization
problem max x [G(x) + H(a)], the decision functions do not depend on the parameters at all, causing xi;α(a) to
vanish identically. This implies the vanishing of Ω and its rank.
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Let the rank of Ω be denoted by ρΩ. Then an upper bound to ρΩ can be readily derived from the theorems that
(a) the rank of an NR × NC matrix cannot exceed min(NR, NC), and (b) the rank of a product cannot exceed
that of any of its factors. Now xi;α(a) is a factor for Ω, and its rank cannot exceed M − K on account of the
constraints, as an argument below will confirm. Therefore, the rank of Ω cannot exceed the smaller of M − K
and A, i.e., ρΩ ≤ min(M − K,A). To establish the rank property of the matrix xi;α(a) just used, recall Lemma
1 of §IIA which states that each column of this matrix must conform to the constraints, i.e., for every value of α,∑M
i=1g
k
,i(x(a),a)xi;α(a) = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. In other words, each of the A derivative vectors xi;α(a) is orthogonal
to the K normal vectors gk,i(x(a),a) in decision space. Now if the constraints are independent, as we have assumed
throughout, then the K normal vectors constitute an independent set of dimension K, forcing the A derivative vectors
to be linearly dependent and at most of dimension M −K, since the sum of these two dimensions cannot exceed M ,
the dimension of the decision space. We have thus established that when viewed as a matrix, xi;α(a) can at most
have M −K linearly independent rows. But this implies that the rank of xi;α(a) is no larger than M −K, which is
the desired result.
As a first example of the rank inequality formula established above, consider the profit maximization problem
of §IIA where K = 0 and A = M + 1. Here, we find ρΩ ≤ min(M,M + 1) = M , again implying that the full,
(M + 1)× (M + 1) CSM will be singular. However, if following standard practice one uses the M ×M submatrix of
the latter corresponding to the partial derivatives of the input factors with respect to input prices, there will no longer
be a necessary rank reduction. As a second example, consider the Slutsky-Hicks problem, also considered in §IIA.
Then with K = 1, we have ρΩ ≤ min(M − 1,M) = M − 1, implying that the M ×M Slutsky matrix is necessarily
singular since its order exceeds its rank at least by one, a well known result. As a third example, we consider the
allocation problem considered in §IIA, where M = G×H, N = L+G+H − 1, and K = G+H − 1. The resulting
L × L CSM will have have a rank no larger than min((G − 1) × (H − 1), L). As a typical situation, let us take
H  L = G ≥ 1. The corresponding CSM will then be of order L and rank L or less, and will not convey detailed
comparative statics information about the G×H optimum allocation levels xhi (a) since there are many more of these
than there are rows in the CSM. Generally speaking, this state of affairs prevails when the dimensions of the decision
and parameter spaces are widely different. Incidentally, with N  M , one ends up with a highly redundant CSM
with ρΩ  A. It is appropriate at this point to emphasize that there may very well be further rank reductions of Ω in
specific cases resulting from the special properties of the objective function, and that the above result represents the
rank reduction that is imposed by the underlying geometry of the GCD’s, independently of the specific properties of
the objective function.
Our next task in this section is a characterization of the arbitrariness in the result of Theorem 1. Specifically,
we must consider the problem defined by Eq. (1) et seq., and seek to classify and characterize all possible CSM’s
associated with this problem. Note that we are taking the set of decision variables as well as the parameter set as
given and fixed, thereby excluding from the present discussion the arbitrariness associated with these choices. It must
be emphasized here that although ordinarily there is a “natural,” or “sensible,” choice of decision and parameter sets
associated with a given problem, there does exist in principle the possibility of considering other sets constructed
from the given ones, or even considering smaller or larger sets by, e.g., ignoring certain parameters as uninteresting or
irrelevant and conversely augmenting the parameter set by introducing auxiliary parameters, or in the case of decision
variables in a constrained problem, discarding a number of constraint equations by solving for a subset of the decision
variables and conversely. Moreover, these alternative choices are not always mere mathematical curiosities devoid of
meaning or use. Indeed we will exploit these extra degrees of freedom in our treatment of the models considered in
§§IIIA and B, where the utility of the alternative choices of both the parameter and decision sets will be evident.
However, as already stipulated, the following discussion will only consider the arbitrariness resulting from the choice
of isovectors and GCD’s, relegating those corresponding to enlarging or contracting the parameter and decision sets
to §III.
Let us recall, in connection with the problem defined by Eq. (1) et seq., that we defined and employed a complete set
of GCD’s according to Dα(a)
def
=
∑N
µ=1t
α
µ∂/∂aµ. Recall also that the set of isovectors t
α, α = 1, . . . , A, is supposed
to be linearly independent and span the tangent hyperplane (which is of dimension A). Consider now a different
choice for the set of isovectors, t˜α, α = 1, . . . , A, with the same properties as tα, which must therefore have the same
dimension A. Since, by supposition, either set is linearly independent and spans the tangent hyperplane (viewed as a
vector space), there must exist a nonsingular matrix C of order A that expresses the new set as a linear combination
of the old, and conversely under the inverse matrix C−1; to wit, t˜αµ
def
=
∑A
β=1Cαβt
β
µ. The set of GCD’s corresponding
to the new isovectors is related to the old set according to D˜α(a)
def
=
∑A
β=1CαβDβ(a), with the inverse transformation
effected by means of C−1. The transformation rule between the corresponding CSM’s follows straightforwardly from
that of the GCD’s. To wit,
Ω˜(a) = CΩ(a)C†, (10)
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where Ω˜ is the CSM constructed from the new isovector set t˜α and C† stands for the transpose of C. Again, the inverse
transformation from Ω˜ to Ω exists and is implemented by C−1. Note that according to Eq. (10), the two matrices Ω
and Ω˜ are congruent. As a pair of CSM’s, on the other hand, Ω and Ω˜ are essentially equivalent in the sense that
(a) the semidefiniteness of one implies that of the other, and (b) the two are of equal rank. Property (a) follows
from the fact that the symmetry of Ω implies that of Ω˜, a fact which readily follows from Eq. (10), together with the
observation that for every pair of real vectors v and v˜ related by v = C†v˜, the quadratic forms v†Ωv and v˜†Ω˜v˜ are
equal. Property (b) is a direct consequence of the nonsingular nature of the transformation matrix C. Intuitively,
properties (a) and (b) follow from the observation that each of the two sets of isovectors from which Ω and Ω˜ are
constructed forms a basis for the tangent hyperplane in the parameter space of the optimization problem, and as
such must provide a description fully equivalent to the other. Following standard matrix nomenclature, we shall refer
to a pair of CSM’s related according to Eq. (10) as a congruent pair. It should be pointed out here, however, that
congruency does not imply similarity of properties as the two matrices can be quite different with respect to such
matters as observability and empirical verification. An example of a congruent but rather dissimilar pair of CSM’s
for the basic profit maximization model will be discussed in §IIIA.
Thus far we have only considered complete sets of GCD’s, i.e., those constructed from a set of isovectors which
constitute a basis for the tangent hyperplane. At this point we shall relax the assumption of completeness and explore
the consequences of a reduced or dependent set of isovectors. Specifically, we shall characterize the CSM’s that are
constructed from such incomplete sets, thereby gaining further insight as to how several CSM’s, possibly of different
order and rank, can provide comparative statics information about the same optimization problem.
Let us first deal with dependent sets of isovectors. Now a set of vectors is dependent if at least one member of
the set is expressible as a linear combination of the rest. It is clear that GCD’s constructed from such sets will be
redundant in the sense that at least one of them will be equal to a linear combination of the rest. Mathematically,
this redundancy translates into the existence of a zero eigenvalue and a concomitant reduction of rank for the CSM
(assuming full rank to start with). Clearly then, no comparative statics content is lost by discarding the redundancies
until the isovector set becomes independent and none of the GCD’s is equal to a combination of the others. To restate
this argument in quantitative terms, let us recall that a set of isovectors t˜α, α = 1, . . . , A, is dependent if there exists
a set of scalars ηα, not all zero, such that the vector represented by the linear combination
∑A
α=1ηαt˜
α vanishes. But
this directly implies the vanishing of
∑A
α=1ηαD˜α(a), hence also of
∑A
α=1ηαΩ˜αβ(a), where D˜α and Ω˜ respectively
represent the set of GCD’s and the CSM constructed from the isovector set t˜α. The vanishing of the last-stated sum
verifies the claim that Ω˜ has a vanishing eigenvalue, hence a rank no larger than A− 1. Thus, carrying through the
transformation process between the two sets of isovectors, GCD’s, and CSM’s as was done above, we arrive at the
result that there exists a singular matrix E, with the property t˜αµ =
∑A
β=1Eαβt
β
µ, such that
Ω˜(a) = EΩ(a)E†. (11)
Note that it follows directly from Eq. (11) that Ω˜ is a semidefinite matrix if Ω is.
At this point one can discard a dependent isovector, i.e., one that can be expressed in terms of the others, and
proceed to examine the remaining set for further linear dependences. It should be clear at this point that only
redundant information is conveyed by means of dependent isovectors and GCD’s. This is essentially the reason
for the stipulation that our isovector sets be independent. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that CSM’s
resulting from dependent isovector sets and redundant GCD’s are nevertheless valid comparative statics statements,
even though they are not optimally concise and may in fact fail to capture all the comparative statics information
pertinent to the model in question.
The last remark returns us to the issue of completeness. Recalling that we are still dealing with the problem defined
by Eq. (1) et seq., we proceed to contemplate a new, smaller set of isovectors t˜αµ , with µ = 1, . . . , N , α = 1, . . . , B,
and B < A; both sets are assumed to be linearly independent. Under these circumstances, we shall refer to t˜αµ as a
contracted set and the transformation as a contraction. This transformation is implemented by a rectangular matrix
R of size B × A: t˜βµ =
∑A
α=1Rβαt
α
µ , β = 1, . . . , B. Continuing with the process of transformation as was carried out
above, we arrive at the result that the B ×B matrix
Ω˜(a) = RΩ(a)R† (12)
is the CSM corresponding to the contracted set. Again one can show directly from Eq. (12) that Ω˜ is a semidefinite
matrix. It is clear that the information conveyed by the contracted CSM is in general reduced relative to the original
CSM. For example, if Ω has full rank, then Ω˜ will be lower in rank by A− B, hence lower in information content as
well.
The last subject to be considered in this section is the effect of generalized transformations on the CSM. Here we
are contemplating the possibility of defining new decision variables and parameters in terms of the old, essentially
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what amounts to a change of coordinates in the decision and parameter spaces. We shall require the transformation
functions to be continuously differentiable with nonvanishing Jacobian determinants (in appropriate neighborhoods
of the respective spaces) in order to insure a one-to-one mapping between the two sets of coordinates. While not as
directly useful in applications as the specific ones considered above, these general transformations nevertheless provide
a framework for contemplating a wide class of CSM’s associated with an optimization problem.
Consider the problem defined in Eq. (1) et seq. and the associated CSM in Eq. (7). Let us rewrite the latter in the
generic form
Ωαβ(a)
def
=
∑M
i=1
∑N
µ=1
Cαβiµ (a)xi,µ(a).
This equation in effect defines the functions Cαβiµ (·). Let us now consider a transformation to the generalized decision
variables and parameters x˜ and a˜, which are related to the original ones according to
xi
def
= ξi(x˜), aµ
def
= αµ(a˜), (13)
where i = 1, . . . ,M and µ = 1, . . . , N . The transformation functions ξi(·) and αµ(·) are assumed to obey the regularity
conditions stated above, so that the inverse transformations ξ˜i(·) and α˜µ(·) exist and are continuously differentiable
functions on <M and <N respectively. An application of the chain rule then leads to
Ω˜αβ(a˜)
def
=
∑M
j=1
∑N
ν=1
C˜αβjν (a˜)x˜j,ν(a˜) (14)
as the transformed CSM. Here C˜αβjν =
∑M
i=1
∑N
µ=1[∂ξi/∂x˜j ]C
αβ
iµ [∂α˜ν/∂aµ]. These results clearly demonstrate that
the freedom in deciding the complexion of the comparative statics information for a given optimization problem
is essentially limitless. Whether any given complexion is useful or even meaningful for the problem at hand is an
altogether separate question. We shall illustrate the workings of these general transformations in §IIIA and IIIB.
We close this section by summarizing the envelope, invariance, rank, and transformation properties established
above.
Theorem 2. The following properties hold for the constrained optimization problem defined by Eq. (1) et seq.:
(i) The value function satisfies the envelope property
V;α(a) = f;α(x(a),a). (15)
Furthermore, if the GCD’s possess the null property with respect to the objective function as well, the value function
satisfies the stronger condition V;α(a) = 0.
(ii) If the optimization problem satisfies the invariance conditions stated in Eq. (8), then the decision functions
possess the invariance property
Xi(x(a))−
∑N
µ=1
Aµ(a)xi,µ(a) = 0. (16)
(iii) The rank of Ω is no larger than the smaller of M −K and A, i.e., ρΩ ≤ min(M −K,A).
(iv) The matrix Ω˜ obtained from Ω by means of the transformation TΩ(a)T†, as in Eqs. (10)-(12), is semidefinite
and constitutes a CSM. Furthermore, if T is nonsingular, as in Eq. (10), then Ω˜ is equivalent to Ω as a CSM, whereas
if T is singular, as in Eq. (11), or if T is rectangular representing a contraction, as in Eq. (12), then Ω˜ has a rank
lower than A and may not be equivalent to Ω as a CSM.
rm (v) If the generalized decision variables and parameters defined in Eqs. (13) et seq. are employed in place of the
original ones, then the corresponding CSM is given by Eq. (14).
C. Further Developments
As mentioned in the Introduction, Samuelson (1947) established the foundations of comparative statics method-
ologies and Silberberg (1974) generalized and advanced that work to the point of constructing a semidefinite matrix
conveying the comparative statics properties of a general optimization problem. However, Silberberg’s (1974) con-
struction has a serious shortcoming in dealing with constrained optimization problems, namely, the subjection of
the said matrix to the constraints. The construction described above and summarized in Theorem 1 removes this
limitation in a general way. Naturally, this raises the question of just how this is accomplished, and the relation, if
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any, between the present method and that of Silberberg (1974). We will answer this question by deriving the result
of Theorem 1 from that of Silberberg (1974).
To that end, let us recall Silberberg’s [1974, Eq. (10)] result as applied to the constrained optimization problem
defined by Eq. (1) et seq. Stated in our notation, the result is the statement that the N ×N matrix
Sµν(a)
def
=
∑M
i=1
xi,ν(a)[f,µi(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,µi(x(a),a)]
+
∑K
k=1
λk,ν(a)g
k
,µ(x(a),a) (17)
is positive semidefinite, subject to constraints. Stated more explicitly, the latter qualification implies that for every
real, N -dimensional vector q such that
∑N
µ=1qµg
k
,µ(x(a),a) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K, the quantity
∑N
µ,ν=1qµSµν(a)qν , or
q†S(a)q for short, is nonnegative. Restated in geometrical terms, the last statement implies that the quadratic form
q†S(a)q is nonnegative provided that the vector q lies in the parameter space tangent hyperplane defined by the
constraint functions. On the other hand, the isovectors tα, α = 1, . . . , A, possess this property by construction (given
in §IIA), as does any linear combination of them. Let us consider then, for any arbitrary real vector ηα, α = 1, . . . , A,
the linear combination
∑A
α=1ηαt
α, and use this in place of q in the quadratic form above. The resulting expression
can in turn be viewed as another quadratic form composed of the A×A symmetric matrix t†αS(a)tβ and the arbitrary
vector ηα. But then the arbitrary nature of ηα permits one to conclude that t
†αS(a)tβ is positive semidefinite. If the
expression for S(a) given in Eq. (17) is now substituted in t†αS(a)tβ and the symmetry of the second-order partial
derivatives of f and gk are used, the parameter space partial derivatives in that expression turn into GCD’s by virtue
of the identity tα · ∇a = Dα(a). This causes the last term in the expression for S(a) to drop out of the resulting form
by virtue of Lemma 1, leaving behind an expression that is found to be identical with the CSM matrix Ω given in
Eq. (7). This completes the deduction of Theorem 1 from Silberberg’s (1974) result.
Next we consider the work of Hatta (1980) referred to in the Introduction, and show that its main comparative
statics result is in fact a special case of Theorem 1. The optimization problem treated by Hatta (1980), given in his
Eq. (10), is a special case of our Eq. (1), and appears as
max x f(x,p) s.t. g
l(x,p, κ)
def
= κl − kl(x,p) = 0, l = 1, 2, . . . ,K
in our notation, where x and p are M -dimensional vectors. The crucial property of this special form is the occurrence
of the parameters κ in a separable, linear manner in the constraint equations, and their absence from the objective
function. This special structure makes it possible to construct a set of GCD’s patterned after those customarily used
for the Slutsky-Hicks problem (cf., §IIA or §IIIB), namely Dα(x,a) def= ∂/∂pα+
∑K
l=1[∂k
l(x,p)/∂pα]∂/∂κl. Note that
the parameter set here is identified as a
def
= (p, κ). Using these GCD’s in Eq. (7), we find the result that the matrix∑M
i=1
[f,iα(x(p,κ),p)−
∑K
l=1
λl(p, κ)k
l
,iα(x(p, κ),p)]{∂xi(p, κ)/∂pβ
+
∑K
l=1
[∂kl(x,p)/∂pβ ]∂xi(p, κ)/∂κl},
is positive semidefinite. This statement is the same as Hatta’s (1980) Theorems 6 and 7, his main comparative statics
results. Note that because of the special structure of the problem, compensation terms appear only in the partial
derivatives of the decision functions, x;α(p, κ) = Dα(x,a)x(p, κ). These compensated derivatives are denoted by
sp(p,x
?(p, κ)) and termed “the Slutskian substitution matrix” by Hatta (1980), while the Lagrange multipliers λl
are represented by φκ in his notation. An examination of the manner in which the quantities sp(p,x
?(p, κ)) are
derived by Hatta (1980), on the other hand, reveals that they are constructed in conformity to the constraints, i.e.,
precisely according to the definition of our GCD’s, although this property is obscured by the presentation. Moreover,
the method of their construction specifically relies on the special role played by the parameters κ and is therefore
limited to the assumed form of the problem. This completes the discussion of how our method relates to the existing
ones for dealing with constrained problems.
Next we turn to developing the results of Theorem 1 in more detail for certain generic forms that naturally arise
within the context of economic problems. This will also allow us to introduce simplified variants of the construc-
tion methods given in §§IIA and B. The first such form arises in the case of unconstrained optimization, to wit,
max x f(x,a). As discussed in §IIA, it is expedient to deal instead with the modified problem max x f˜(x,b), where
f˜(x,b)
def
= sf(x,a), and where s > 0 is viewed as the (N +1)st parameter in the modified problem. Since the decision
functions for these two problems must be the same, we have the statement that ∂∂s x˜(b) = 0 for the modified problem,
so that we can use x(a) to denote the decision functions for both problems without any fear of confusion. Obviously,
other quantities of interest in the original problem can be recovered from those of the modified version by setting the
auxiliary parameter s equal to unity.
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An important advantage of introducing the auxiliary parameter is that it allows a natural choice of GCD’s, as well
as a simple method of constructing them. The idea is to start with the set of partial derivatives ∂∂aα and linearly
combine each of these with ∂∂s in such a way that the application of the resulting combination to the (modified)
objective function f˜(x,b) returns zero identically. Applying this prescription, one can readily construct the set
of GCD’s given by Dα(x,b) = f˜
′(x,b) ∂∂aα − f˜,α(x,b) ∂∂s , α = 1, . . . , N , where f˜ ′(x,b)
def
= ∂∂s f˜(x,b). This brute
force method of constructing GCD’s will be referred to as the one-term compensation method. It is simple and
direct, and will suffice when there is only one target function, such as in the present case, or the case of constrained
optimization with only one constraint and no stipulation that the GCD’s have the null property with respect to the
objective function of the problem. Needless to say, this already encompasses a number of important cases of interest
in economic problems.
The next step is the construction of the CSM, using the GCD’s defined above by the method of one-term com-
pensation. First, let us note that f˜ ′(x,b) = f(x,a), and xi;α(a) = f(x(a),a)xi,α(a) since the decision functions
are independent of the auxiliary parameter. On the other hand, f˜,i;β(x,b) = f(x,a)sf,iβ(x,a) − sf,β(x,a)f,i(x,a),
β = 1, . . . , N . Restricting all of these expressions to the solution x = x(a) and substituting them in Eq. (7) while
setting the auxiliary parameter s equal to unity, we find, upon some rearrangement, the matrix
ΩA1µν(a)
def
= f(x(a),a)
∑M
i=1
xi,ν(a)[log f(x(a),a)],iµ (18)
as a CSM for the original problem.
A useful variant of ΩA1 results upon carrying out the implied differentiations in Eq. (18) and using the first-order
condition. However, it is more instructive to derive this variant directly from Theorem 1. To do so, let us recall that
Theorem 1 requires the null property of the GCD’s only with respect to the constraint functions, leaving the same
property with respect to the objective function as an option. Therefore, Theorem 1 can be applied to unconstrained
problems provided that GCD’s are replaced with ordinary partial derivatives. This is because, for unconstrained
problems, the null property required of the GCD’s with respect to the constraint functions is vacuously satisfied by
ordinary partial derivatives. Therefore, we have a corollary of Theorem 1 stating that the matrix
ΩA2µν(a)
def
=
∑M
i=1
xi,ν(a)f,iµ(x(a),a) (19)
is a CSM. This is the desired variant mentioned above, a form that also follows directly from Silberberg’s (1974)
general theorem discussed earlier. Although Eqs. (18) and (19) are trivially related, it is useful to record them both
since they do lead to different forms of CSM’s.
Corollary A. If K = 0 in Theorem 1, i.e., in the absence of constraints, ΩA1 and ΩA2 given by Eqs. (18) and (19)
respectively, are comparative statics matrices.
Returning now to the general problem posed in Eq. (1), let us again introduce the auxiliary parameter s and treat the
modified problem max x sf(x,a) s.t. g
k(x,a) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. We start by using the general construction scheme of
§IIA to develop a set of GCD’s, denoted by Dα(x,a) as before, with respect to the constraint functions gk(x,a); the
associated null property is Dα(x,a)g
k(x,a) = 0, α = 1, . . . , A and k = 1, . . . ,K. Next, we use the auxiliary variable
s in conjunction with the one-term compensation method to extend the null property just stated to the objective
function. In this manner we arrive at the set of modified GCD’s D˜α(x,b)
def
= f(x,a)Dα(x,a) − sf;α(x,a) ∂∂s , where
b = (a, s) and a semicolon represents compensated differentiation with respect to the unmodified GCD’s, as before.
These modified GCD’s have the null property with respect to the modified objective function as well as the constraint
functions: D˜α(x,b)f˜(x,b) = D˜α(x,b)g
k(x,a) = 0, α = 1, . . . , A and k = 1, . . . ,K, where f˜(x,b)
def
= sf(x,a) as
before.
Our next step is the construction of the CSM, remembering that the decision functions are independent of the
auxiliary parameter, and that results appropriate to the original problem are recovered from those of the modified
version upon setting s equal to unity. Carrying out the necessary steps, we find, after some rearrangement,
ΩBαβ(a)
def
= f(x(a),a)
∑M
i=1
xi;β(a){[log f(x(a),a)],i;α +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,i;α(x(a),a)}. (20)
Again, as in the case of Eq. (18), a variant of this equation can be derived by applying the first-order condition in
combination with Lemma 1 established in §IIA; this variant turns out to be Ω of Theorem 1. Both variants are
useful, however, and can lead to rather different forms of CSM’s. Therefore, we will record the result in Eq. (20) as a
corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary B. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, ΩB given in Eq. (20) is a comparative statics matrix.
Let us mention in passing that for K = 1, the case of one constraint, the method of one-term compensation can be
usefully employed in the construction of Ω and ΩB.
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In §IIB we discussed the large arbitrariness in the choice of the CSM’s associated with a given optimization problem,
and have otherwise provided examples of this arbitrariness in the construction of isovector sets and GCD’s. We will
close this subsection by exploring and highlighting the invariant characteristics that lie at the root of all these CSM’s.
Not surprisingly, it is again the underlying geometric structure that is most effective in providing an intuitive picture
of what is going on. Since the characteristics we seek are essentially the same for constrained and unconstrained
problems, we shall discuss them within the latter context for simplicity.
Consider an unconstrained optimization problem with the objective function f(x,a) and M = 1, i.e., one decision
variable, endowed with the regularity properties set out in §IIA. Suppose further that there exists a local maximum
of f as a function of x at some interior point x(a). Clearly, for a fixed value of a, f(x,a) is concave at x = x(a), and
f,11(x(a),a) is a negative semidefinite number equal to the curvature of the graph of f at the maximum point. Next,
consider the analogous situation in M dimensions, with x ∈ <M and f,i(x(a),a) = 0, where x(a) is the maximizing
point. The concavity condition is now equivalent to the negative semidefiniteness of the matrix of second-order
partial derivatives, f,ij(x(a),a). Since this matrix is real and symmetric, an equivalent condition is the negative
semidefiniteness of its eigenvalues, the set of which is known as the spectrum of the matrix. Geometrically, these
eigenvalues can be thought of as the principal curvatures of the surface xM+1− f(x,a) = 0 in <M+1 at the maximum
point (f(x(a),a),x(a)), as may be surmised by analogy with the one-dimensional case. Note that this surface is the
graph of f as a function of x, as suggested by analogy to the one-dimensional case. To see this analogy more clearly,
let us imagine, for M = 2, the surface of a smooth hilltop as representing the graph, with elevation representing the
value of the objective function and the apex as the maximum point. Each vertical plane containing the apex will
intersect the surface of the hilltop in a curve which has a maximum at the apex, and a curvature associated with the
maximum. The set of curvatures so defined has a maximum, which is the largest of the principal curvatures, and the
associated vertical plane is a principal plane. Next, we restrict the set of vertical planes to those orthogonal to the
principal plane(s) already found, and repeat the procedure. In two dimensions, of course, there is only one such plane,
the curvature associated with which is the minimum principal curvature. For M > 2, this process continues through
M steps, culminating in a nonincreasing sequence of M principal curvatures. These are the eigenvalues constituting
the spectrum of f,ij(x(a),a). Note that for a spherical hilltop (M = 2), the two curvatures are equal, corresponding
to a spectrum composed of two equal eigenvalues. The most general case for M = 2, on the other hand, is that of an
ellipsoidal hilltop, corresponding to an unequal pair of nonpositive eigenvalues. The singular cases here include one
vanishing eigenvalue, corresponding to a cylindrical hilltop, and two vanishing eigenvalues, corresponding to a flat
hilltop. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stated that the curvatures considered here are the so-called extrinsic
curvatures, not to be confused with the intrinsic, or Gaussian curvatures.
Using this geometrical construction, one can reformulate the second-order conditions by stating that the set of
principal curvatures, equivalently the spectrum of the objective function at the maximum point, must be nonpositive.
It is this semidefiniteness of the spectrum of f,ij(x(a),a) that underlies all comparative statics results. This is seen
most directly by noting that, in the absence of constraints, the matrix Ω of Eq. (7) is related to f,ij(x(a),a) according
to
Ωµν(a) = −
∑M
i,j=1
xi,µ(a)f,ij(x(a),a)xj,ν(a). (21)
First, observe that this relation shows Ωµν(a) to be symmetric as a direct consequence of the symmetry of f,ij(x(a),a).
This property, on the other hand, guarantees that Ωµν(a) has a spectrum consisting of A real eigenvalues, together
with a set of corresponding eigenvectors. We will denote these by µ(γ) and z(γ), respectively. In other words, we have∑A
ν=1Ωµν(a)z
(γ)
ν = µ(γ)z
(γ)
µ for all values of γ and µ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the eigenvectors
have unit length, i.e., that
∑A
µ=1z
(γ)
µ z
(γ)
µ = 1. Now multiply Eq. (21) on both sides by the eigenvector z(γ); the result
is µ(γ) = −∑Mi,j=1q(γ)i f,ij(x(a),a)q(γ)j , where q(γ)i def= ∑Aµ=1z(γ)µ xi,µ(a). Finally, if we denote the M eigenvalues (or
principal curvatures) and (normalized) eigenvectors of f,ij(x(a),a) by m
(I) and b(I), we find from the last equation
µ(γ) = −
∑M
I=1
(q(γ) · b(I))2m(I), (22)
where we have used the spectral decomposition f,ij =
∑M
I=1m
(I)b
(I)
i b
(I)
j to replace the Hessian matrix in favor of its
invariant characteristics. Equation (22) clearly shows that the eigenvalues of Ω are linear combinations of those of
f,ij(x(a),a) with nonpositive coefficients. Inasmuch as the spectrum of f,ij(x(a),a) is known to be nonpositive, one
is assured of the nonnegativity of the spectrum of Ω.
Recall now that f,ij(x(a),a) and its spectrum {m(I)} are basically unique for a given problem (and a given local
maximum, if there is more than one). The corresponding CSM, on the other hand, can be constructed in an infinite
variety of ways. For example, one may recall from Theorem 2-(iv) that any matrix of the form TΩT† is a CSM for a
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given model if Ω is. All of these matrices, and many more, qualify as CSM’s by virtue of the fact that the spectrum
{m(I)} is nonpositive, as is evident in Eq. (22). In short, the concavity of the objective function, or the nonpositivity
of the spectrum of f,ij(x(a),a), is the invariant property that guarantees the existence of a great variety of CSM’s.
D. A Universal Comparative Statics Matrix
The preceding discussion has underlined the fact that all comparative statics information stemming from the
underlying optimization hypothesis originates from the semidefinite spectrum of principal curvatures at the optimum
point. Given a constrained optimization problem, then, there arises the question of whether there exists a universal
construction that yields the corresponding comparative statics information exhaustively (i.e., from which any other
CSM can be derived)? The answer is affirmative, as we will now show. Specifically, we shall construct a comparative
statics matrix for the problem defined in Eq. (1) without any recourse to the geometry of the parameter space or
generalized compensated derivatives. This construction is almost entirely anchored in decision space, and achieves its
results by relying on intrinsic, projective techniques. The result is a constraint-free, maximal CSM, i.e., a semidefinite
matrix with the highest possible rank for the given parameter set. We shall refer to this matrix as the universal CSM.
The maximal property of the universal CSM implies that any other CSM which uses the same parameter set or a
subset thereof, or indeed any comparative statics statement derivable from the underlying optimization problem which
is expressible in terms of the said parameter set is implied by the universal CSM. Not surprisingly, the universal CSM
is not as convenient to construct or apply as those constructed by the method of generalized compensated derivatives
utilized throughout this work. From a theoretical point of view, on the other hand, the existence theorem for the
universal matrix established below is a more fundamental result than that of Theorem 1 (which it implies), insofar
as it provides a constructive proof for the existence of a constraint-free, maximal comparative statics matrix for a
general optimization problem.
Let us recall the general optimization problem
max x f(x,a) s.t. g
k(x,a) = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
subject to the regularity and existence conditions stipulated in §IIB. As elsewhere in this work, we shall assume
that the constraints are independent at the solution point, i.e., that the set of K normal vectors in decision space,
gk,i(x(a),a), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, is linearly independent (which assumption, it may be recalled, is a constraint qualification
condition). Equivalently, the symmetric, K × K matrix Gkk′(x(a),a) def=
∑M
i=1g
k
,i(x(a),a)g
k′
,i (x(a),a) possesses full
rank and is therefore invertible. Thus the normal hyperplane (generated by the set of normal vectors) in decision space
is of dimension K, and its orthogonal complement, the tangent hyperplane, has dimension M − K. Consequently,
any decision space vector w possesses a unique orthogonal decomposition w = wn + wt corresponding to the above
decomposition. According to standard results of linear algebra, there exists a symmetric, idempotent, M × M
projection matrix Q such that wn = Qw and wt = (I − Q)w, where I is the identity matrix. The construction of Q
may be accomplished by first establishing an orthonormal basis ek, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, for the normal hyperplane (e.g.,
by orthonormalizing the set of normal vectors gk,i) and then using the formula Qij =
∑K
k=1e
k
i e
k
j . The end result of
that procedure is the compact formula Qij(x(a),a) =
∑K
k,k′=1g
k
,i(x(a),a)G−1kk′(x(a),a)gk
′
,j (x(a),a). Indeed one can
verify by direct calculation that Q as given satisfies the stated properties, and therefore that Q and I − Q are the
projection matrices onto the normal and tangent hyperplanes, respectively.
At this point we recall from §IIB that the matrix
Lij(x(a),a)
def
= L,ij(x(a),a) = f,ij(x(a),a) +
∑K
k=1
λk(a)g
k
,ij(x(a),a)
is negative semidefinite subject to the constraints. In other words, v†Lv ≤ 0 provided v is an isovector in decision
space, i.e., a vector in the (decision space) tangent hyperplane. Since for any M -vector w, (I − Q)w is an isovector,
we have the result that (I− Q)L(I− Q) is a negative semidefinite matrix.
Next we differentiate the first order conditions L,i = f,i +
∑K
k=1λkg
k
,i = 0 restricted to the optimum point x = x(a)
with respect to aµ, and left-multiply the result by the projection matrix I− Q, also restricted to the optimum point.
The result is ∑M
i=1
{(I− Q)li[L,iµ +
∑M
j=1
L,ijxj,µ]} = 0,
where we have left out the arguments of various functions for brevity. The next step is to left-multiply the last
equation by x,ν
†, the partial derivative of the decision vector with respect to aν . This multiplication leads to∑M
i,l=1
xl,ν{(I− Q)li[L,iµ +
∑M
j=1
L,ij
∑M
m=1
(Q + I− Q)jmxm,µ]} = 0,
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where we have also inserted the identity matrix in the form (Q + I− Q)jm between L and x,µ in the above equation.
With this insertion, we have arranged for the appearance of the matrix x,ν
†(I−Q)L(I−Q)x,µ in the equation, a matrix
which is negative semidefinite by virtue of the fact, established in the preceding paragraph, that (I− Q)L(I − Q) is
negative semidefinite. The remaining terms in the above equation must therefore constitute a positive semidefinite
matrix. Thus the matrix
Uνµ
def
=
∑M
i,l=1
xl,ν{(I− Q)li[L,iµ +
∑M
j=1
L,ij
∑M
m=1
Qjmxm,µ]}
is positive semidefinite (which, it may be recalled, implies that it is symmetric as well).
To convert the above form for U to a CSM, we must now eliminate the decision functions from the term∑M
m=1Qjmxm,µ. To that end, we use the definition of Q to write
∑M
m=1Qjmxm,µ =
∑M
m=1
∑K
k,k′=1g
k
,jG−1kk′gk
′
,mxm,µ.
Then, using the identity gk,µ +
∑M
m=1g
k
,mxm,µ = 0 which results from a differentiation of the constraint functions
restricted to the optimum point with respect to aµ, we arrive at
Theorem 3. The constrained optimization problem defined by Eq. (1) et seq. admits of the following constraint-free,
positive semidefinite, comparative statics matrix:
Uµν(a) =
∑M
i,j=1
xi,µ(a)[I− Q(x(a),a)]ij{L,jν(x(a),a)−∑M
l=1
L,jl(x(a),a)
∑K
k,k′=1
gk,l(x(a),a)G−1kk′(x(a),a)gk
′
,ν (x(a),a)}. (23)
The rank of U is no larger than the smaller of M −K and N , i.e., ρU ≤ min(M −K,N).
The rank property of U stated above is readily established by an argument patterned after the one leading to
Theorem 2-(iii). The maximal nature of U, on the other hand, is easily ascertained by noting that the rank of any
CSM associated with the underlying optimization problem is limited by (i) the dimension of the constrained decision
space, namely M −K, and (ii) the size of the parameter set, namely N . Thus no CSM can be of higher rank than the
smaller of these two integers, which shows that U has the highest possible rank. It is worth recalling here that zeros
in the spectrum of L or other “exceptional” circumstances may, in specific cases, reduce the rank of a CSM below the
values deduced by general arguments.
We shall conclude our discussion of the universal CSM by establishing its relation to Ω of Theorem 1. To that
end, let tαµ , α = 1, 2, . . . , A, µ = 1, 2, . . . , N , be the set of isovectors used in the construction of Ω. Then the desired
relation is given by Ωαβ=
∑N
µ,ν=1t
α
µUµνt
β
ν . To establish this result, first note that
∑N
µ=1t
α
µxi,µ by definition equals
xi;α, a generalized compensated derivative of a decision function, and that according to Lemma 1 any such derivative
conforms to the constraints. But then we must have
∑M
i=1xi;αQij = 0, α = 1, 2, . . . , A, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M , since Q
is the projection matrix onto the normal hyperplane and annihilates any conforming vector upon contraction. This
is a crucial property in the derivation, and one that clearly shows how the application of generalized compensated
derivatives in effect obviates the use of projection matrices. To complete the derivation, we substitute the defining
expression for U given in Theorem 3 in the expression
∑N
µ,ν=1t
α
µUµνt
β
ν , and observe that the contributions involving
the projection operator Q, including the second term within the square brackets of Eq. (23), vanish by virtue of the
annihilation property just remarked upon. Taking account of the symmetry of either CSM, we find that the remaining
contributions are exactly equal to Ωαβ , as claimed.
The relation between Ω and U stated above provides further insight into their rank properties. Recalling the
theorems pertaining to the rank of a matrix quoted in §IIB, we conclude that the rank of Ω is no larger than the
smaller of the ranks of U and tαµ , with the latter viewed as an A × N matrix. Since the latter rank is never larger
than A, we arrive at the result of Theorem 2-(iii) that ρΩ ≤ min(M −K,N,A) = min(M −K,A), since A is never
larger than N . But this derivation also demonstrates that in those cases where N ≤M −K and A < N , the rank of
U will in general be larger than that of Ω, simply because tαµ is at most of rank A. The latter is in turn caused by
the fact that the process of compensation prohibits differentiation with respect to the normal directions in parameter
space, while the present construction does not. As we have already remarked, and will be amply demonstrated in the
applications, one can always compensate for this shortfall by introducing auxiliary parameters into the objective or
constraint functions.
As remarked earlier, the construction and application of the universal CSM is not as straightforward as in the
case of Ω. For example, a comparison of the two for the Slutsky-Hicks problem clearly shows that U is less intuitive
and more laborious to construct and, moreover, that it emerges in a rather unfamiliar form which requires further
manipulation to appear as the standard result.
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III. APPLICATIONS
The primary purpose of this section is to illustrate the workings of the method of generalized compensated deriva-
tives. A second, parallel objective is to present and discuss certain novel results that naturally emerge from the
applications of this method. We have already introduced a number of model problems in connection with the con-
struction of GCD’s, and will be referring to these in the following sections. Furthermore, we will not repeat the
regularity conditions stipulated in §IIB for the objective and constraint functions, assuming instead that they are
appropriately fulfilled in each application. Throughout this section, we shall summarize the main results obtained
for the analyzed models in italicized and numbered statements, each referred to as a property. Furthermore, we shall
distinguish results which we believe to be new by indenting them as new paragraphs.
A. Profit Maximization
Consider the basic profit maximization model introduced in §IIA, where one seeks to maximize the objective function
f(x,a)
def
= pF (x)− x ·w by an appropriate choice of input factors x. Since this is an unconstrained problem, we can
directly apply Eq. (19) of Corollary A to it. Taking the set of parameters a to equal the single parameter p, we find (i)
∂F (x(w, p))/∂p ≥ 0, while choosing w as the parameter set, we obtain (ii) the matrix Wµν(w, p) def= ∂xµ(w, p)/∂wν
is negative semidefinite. Since semidefiniteness entails symmetry, the familiar reciprocity relations among the demand
functions are already implicit in Property (ii). To establish the homogeneity property of the demand functions, on
the other hand, we appeal to Theorem 2. Here we choose X(x)
def
= 0 and A(a)
def
= a, where the set of parameters a
is now enlarged to (w, p). It can then be readily verified that the objective function f satisfies the prerequisites of
that theorem (assuming definiteness for the Hessian matrix associated with F ). The conclusion, given in Eq. (11), is
(iii)
∑M
µ=1wµ∂x(w, p)/∂wµ + p∂x(w, p)/∂p = 0, which, by way of Euler’s theorem, asserts that the demand functions
(hence also the supply function) are homogeneous of degree zero in the prices. These are of course the standard
properties of the basic profit maximization model.
To provide further illustrations of the results of §II, we now proceed to analyze the above model by explicitly
employing two different sets of GCD’s. For the first, we take the set of parameters to be a
def
= (w, p), M + 1 in
number. Then, starting with the M partial derivatives ∂/∂wα, we construct a set of GCD’s equipped with the null
property with respect to f by the method of one-term compensation, using p as the compensating parameter. The
result is Dα(x,a) = F (x)∂/∂wα + xα∂/∂p, α = 1, . . . ,M . Substituting this set in Theorem 1, we find the result that
the matrix ∑M
σ=1
[δµσ − xµ(w, p)wσ/pF (x(w, p))]{xσ,ν(w, p) + [xν(w, p)xσ,M+1(w, p)]/F (x(w, p))}
is negative semidefinite. Upon denoting the combination xµ(w, p)/F (x(w, p)) by ζµ(w, p), we can rearrange this
result as
Property (iv) The matrix
Zµν(w, p)
def
= ∂ζµ(w, p)/∂wν + ζν(w, p)∂ζµ(w, p)/∂p (24)
is negative semidefinite.
This last result is formally identical to one derived by Paris, Caputo, and Holloway (1993, Eq. 11) in their treatment
of the long-run competitive equilibrium model of the firm under conditions of free entry and exit. These authors set
up an optimization problem modeling the behavior of a representative firm under equilibrium conditions, including
a restriction to zero profits. It turns out that the resulting model is equivalent to profit maximization restricted to
zero profits, hence the formal identity of their result to Property (iv). Moreover, their derivation continues to be
valid at all (positive) profit levels, so that the two results are essentially identical, albeit with differing interpretations.
These authors then relate their result to that of the minimum average cost model considered in earlier literature,
thereby pointing to a second method of deriving Eq. (24) at zero profits. At any rate, the new insight gained here is
the realization that the comparative statics results conveyed by Eq. (24) are those of any profit maximizing firm at
any profit level, and are therefore not specific characteristics of firms under long-run equilibrium conditions. We will
return to Z below and point out further properties of this matrix in connection with Theorem 2.
At this point we turn to the second set of GCD’s, slightly different from the first set we just employed to derive
Property (iv). This is the set we developed for the profit maximization problem in §IIA, where we enlarged the
parameter set to include an auxiliary parameter. In effect, we will now seek to maximize the modified objective
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function f˜(x,a)
def
= s[pF (x) − x · w] with the understanding that the auxiliary parameter s > 0 must be set equal
to unity to recover the original problem. There are M decision variables as before, but the parameter set has been
enlarged to a
def
= (w, p, s), M+2 in number. We will employ the set of M+1 GCD’s developed for this problem in §IIA,
and use these in Eq. (7), with K = 0 corresponding to the absence of constraints. As a preliminary step, let us carry
out the differentiations required in Eq. (7), then set s equal to unity. This gives us xi;β(a) = [xi,ν(a), xi,M+1(a)], and
f,i;α(x(a),a) = [−δiµ, F,i(x(a))], where α, β = 1, . . . ,M + 1, i, µ, ν = 1, . . . ,M , and α = µ, β = ν for µ, ν = 1, . . . ,M .
The CSM can now be assembled according to Eq. (7). It is actually more convenient at this point to state the
semidefiniteness properties of the resulting CSM in two parts. The first part conveys the symmetry of the CSM, and it
consists of the familiar reciprocity relations xµ,ν(w, p) = xν,µ(w, p), as well as (v) xµ,M+1(w, p) = −∂F (x(w, p))/∂wµ.
The second part conveys the specific semidefiniteness property of the CSM, and it is most conveniently stated as the
nonnegativity of the quadratic form
∑M+1
α,β=1bαΩαβ(a)bβ . Here b stands for the (M + 1)-vector (q, q), where q and q
respectively represent an arbitrary M -vector and a scalar. Upon some rearrangement using the reciprocity relations
of W, we can recast this result as the inequality
∑M
µ,ν=1
(qµ − qwµ/p)xµ,ν(w, p)(qν − qwν/p) ≤ 0. (25)
We now proceed to consider certain consequences of Property (v) and inequality (25). Let us start transforming
(v) by writing ∂F (x(w, p))/∂wµ =
∑M
i=1F,i(x(w, p))xi,µ(w, p) and then eliminating F,i(x(w, p)) in favor of wi/p by
means of the first-order conditions. An application of the reciprocity relations to the emergent expression then yields
the homogeneity result found under (iii) by way of Euler’s theorem. Here we have derived the homogeneity property
as a consequence of the semidefiniteness of an enlarged CSM.
Next we turn to inequality (25), and let q =
∑M
σ=1qσlσ, where l is any real vector of dimension M . This leads to
the result that the matrix ∑M
σ,ρ=1
(δµσ − lµwσ/p)(∂xσ(w, p)/∂wρ)(δρν − wρlν/p) (26)
is negative semidefinite for any choice of l. This is a powerful result; for example, it can be used to derive Properties
(ii) and (iv) by simply choosing l respectively equal to zero and x(w, p)/F (x(w, p)) in (26). Furthermore, it can
also be used to derive a sharpened version of (ii) by choosing l equal to [∂x(w, p)/∂p]/[∂F (x(w, p))/∂p]. Upon some
rearrangement using the reciprocity relations and Euler’s theorem, this choice transforms the matrix in (26) into a
useful form as summarized below.
Property (vi) the matrix
W?µν(w, p)
def
= Wµν(w, p) +
(∂xµ(w, p)/∂p)(∂xν(w, p)/∂p)
∂F (x(w, p))/∂p
(27)
is negative semidefinite.
This result, although not present in the standard treatments of the profit maximization model in the literature, can
nevertheless be easily derived by standard methods, e.g., by exploiting the convexity of the profit function with respect
to all prices and applying the envelope relations. What turns Eq. (27) into a powerful result is the realization that
the second matrix on the right-hand side is positive semidefinite since its denominator ∂F (x(w, p))/∂p is nonnegative
by Property (i) and its numerator is of the generically positive semidefinite complexion AµAν . This fact implies that
the semidefiniteness of W? is a stronger statement than that of W. In particular, the nonpositivity of the diagonal
elements of W? yields a sharpened version of the standard result on the slopes of the demand functions with respect
to their own prices. Since this is a rather significant result and has obvious implications for issues related to empirical
testing, we will consider it in some detail.
Let us start by restating the condition W?µµ ≤ 0 in a different but equivalent form as
Property (vii) The slope of the demand functions with respect to their own prices are bounded above according to
∂xµ(w, p)/∂wµ ≤ −(∂xµ(w, p)/∂p)2/[∂F (x(w, p))/∂p]. (28)
Clearly, this inequality is in general stronger than its standard counterpart, ∂xµ(w, p)/∂wµ ≤ 0, and more significantly,
it sets limits on the magnitude of the slopes in question. To see a numerical example of this comparison, let us consider
the Cobb-Douglas production function, given by FCD(x)
def
= F0
∏M
i=1x
γi
i , where 0 < γi < 1,
∑M
i=1γi
def
= γ < 1,
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i = 1, . . . ,M , and F0 is a fixed positive number. A straightforward, if tedious, calculation gives the results
∂xCDµ (w, p)
∂wν
= −x
CD
µ (w, p)
wν
(δµν +
γν
1− γ ),
∂xCDµ (w, p)
∂p
=
xCDµ (w, p)
p
1
1− γ ,
∂FCD(w, p)
∂p
=
FCD(w, p)
p
γ
1− γ
for the Cobb-Douglas production function. It is worth noting that the remarkable simplicity of these results is
essentially a consequence of the special scaling properties of the model. These scaling properties are most clearly
evident in the set of relations ∂ logFCD(x)/∂ log xi = γi. Using these results, we can calculate the bound given
on the right-hand side of (28) for the Cobb-Douglas case, and compare it to zero (which is the bound given by the
standard result) as well as to the exact result (i.e., ∂xCDµ (w, p)/∂wν) calculated for the model. This comparison is
most usefully stated in terms of the elasticity εµµ
def
= ∂ log[xµ(w, p)]/∂ log(wµ) rather than the dimensional slope given
in (28). A calculation using the above results shows that the demand elasticities for the Cobb-Douglas case, εCDµµ , are
bounded above by −γµ/γ(1− γ) according to (28). This should be compared to the (weaker) bound of zero given by
the standard result, and to the exact value εCDµµ = −[1 + γµ/(1− γ)]. For a two-factor model with γ1 = γ2 = 1/3, for
example, these three numbers are −3/2, 0, and −2, respectively. Clearly, the restrictive conditions given in Eqs. (27)
and (28) convey more stringent consequences of the profit maximization hypothesis than those given by the standard
result, thus providing a correspondingly more rigorous means of testing that hypothesis.
Not surprisingly, there exists a sharpened bound on the elasticity of the supply function as well. The standard
result, stated above as Property (i), guarantees that ∂F (x(w, p))/∂p ≥ 0. On the other hand, a procedure similar to
the one leading to (28) yields
Property (viii) The slope of the supply function is bounded below according to the following inequality:
∂F (x(w, p))/∂p ≥ −
∑M
µ,ν=1
(wµ/p)(wν/p)∂xµ(w, p)/∂wν . (29)
Since the right-hand side of (29) is positive semidefinite, we have in this inequality a sharpened version of the
standard result. Using the Cobb-Douglas case as an example again, we find that the elasticity of the supply function,
σ
def
= ∂ log[F (x(w, p))]/∂ log(p), is bounded below by γ/(1 − γ). This bound turns out to be the same as the exact
value σCD, and greater than the bound of zero given by the standard result.
For reference purposes, we will outline here generalized versions of (28) and (29) appropriate to the multi-output
profit maximization model. This model is defined by f(x,a)
def
= p · F(x)− x ·w, where the production function and
the output price have been promoted to the status of G-dimensional vectors. The basic CSM, constructed for the set
of parameters a
def
= (w,p), is most conveniently described as a 2× 2 block matrix
T
def
=
[−W −M
Q P
]
, (30)
where W is the matrix of the partial derivatives of the input factors with respect to the input prices introduced
above, P is its output counterpart Prs(w,p)
def
= ∂Fr(x(w,p))/∂ps, r, s = 1, . . . , G, Mµr(w,p)
def
= ∂xµ(w,p)/∂pr, and
Qrµ(w,p)
def
= ∂Fr(x(w,p))/∂wµ. The last two are typically rectangular matrices, respectively M ×G and G×M in
size. The comparative statics properties of this model are summarized in the positive semidefiniteness of the block
matrix T. This statement in turn implies the positive semidefiniteness of the blocks −W and P, as well as the equality
−M = Q† required by the symmetry of T. These are the standard comparative statics results of the model, and in
effect generalize the basic results of the single-output model to the present case.
One can improve upon these standard results by treating T as a whole and seeking to optimize the bounds on
the slopes of the demand and supply functions as was done above. Remarkably, this can be accomplished in the
following elegant manner. Consider a real (M +G)-vector z = (u,v), u and v “block vectors” of dimension M and G
respectively, and form the quadratic form z†Tz. This quantity is guaranteed to be nonnegative by the semidefiniteness
of T, a property which implies the inequality u†Wu ≤ −u†Mv − v†M†u + v†Pv. At this point, we seek to minimize
the right-hand side of this inequality with v as choice variables and u as parameters. This requirement amounts to
looking for the least upper bound to the eigenvalues of W. The solution to this optimization problem is found to be
v? = P−1M†u, which, upon substitution in the inequality found above, leads to the result
u†Wu ≤ −u†MP−1M†u.
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Recalling at this point that u is an arbitrary vector, we can restate this inequality as the negative semidefiniteness of
the matrix W+MP−1M†. An entirely analogous procedure yields a corresponding result for the output block P. These
two results, which are the generalizations of Properties (vii) and (viii) of the single-output case, are summarized as
Property (ix) The pair of matrices
W?
def
= W + MP−1M†, P? def= P + M†W−1M (31)
are negative semidefinite and positive semidefinite respectively.
Because MP−1M† and M†W−1M are positive semidefinite and negative semidefinite matrices respectively, the new
pair W? and P? represent sharpened versions of W and P respectively, in the same sense and for essentially the same
reasons as were explained in the single-output case above. Thus Eqs. (31) provide the desired generalizations of (27)
and (29) to the multi-output case. It might be mentioned here that the new pair are actually optimal in the sense
that they cannot in general be sharpened any further. It may also be added that the occurrence of inverse matrices in
Eqs. (31) does not invalidate the intended results in case W or P turns out to be singular, although further analysis
may be necessary to reestablish the appropriate results.
It is appropriate at this point to pause and recall Theorem 2-(iv) and our frequent references to the arbitrariness
in the choice of GCD’s and the form of the resulting CSM’s vis-a`-vis the fact that all such forms have an essentially
unique source, namely the local concavity of the objective function. As an illustration of this, consider the structure
in (26) which consists of a family of CSM’s for the (single output) profit maximization model. Now this family is
precisely of the form given in Theorem 2-(iv) with Tµσ identified with ∆µσ
def
= δµσ − lµwσ/p and Ω with W, where, it
will be recalled, W stands for the negative semidefinite matrix ∂xσ(w, p)/∂wρ, the standard CSM of the model. At
this point it is useful to know the spectrum of ∆, which can be found straightforwardly. It consists of an (M − 1)-fold
degenerate eigenvalue equal to unity (the corresponding eigenvectors being any linearly independent set of M − 1
vectors orthogonal to w) and a simple eigenvalue equal to 1−w · l/p (the corresponding eigenvector being l). Clearly,
the determinant of ∆ equals this last eigenvalue, so that as long as p−w · l 6= 0, the matrix ∆ is nonsingular and the
above family is congruent to W, as in Eq. (10). However, for p −w · l = 0, ∆ loses full rank and becomes singular,
as in Eq. (11), causing a breakdown of the congruence between W and the above family of CSM’s. Remarkably, this
is exactly what happens to Z at zero profits (although it has nothing to do with profits as such; see the following
paragraph). To see this, recall that Z is a member of the above family with l = x(w, p)/F (x(w, p)). Thus the singular
point for Z corresponds to pF (w, p)−w ·x(w, p) = 0, the point of vanishing profits. Of course this does not invalidate
Z as a CSM, as was pointed out in §IIB, but it does reduce its rank and the information it contains, relative to W, at
the zero-profits point.
Why does the rank reduction just discussed occur at the point of vanishing profits? After all, the zero-profits point
can be moved by the addition of a fixed constant to the objective function and therefore seems to be no different than
any other profit level. The answer is revealed by an application of Theorem 2-(v). Recall that the latter allows a
transformation of decision variables (as well as the parameters), subject to the condition that the associated Jacobian
determinant not vanish. Let us therefore consider a transformation from x to x˜
def
= x/F (x). Now consider the matrix
∂x˜i/∂xj , which is found to equal [δij − xiwj/pF (x)]/F (x), where first-order conditions have been used. But this
matrix is, save for the scalar factor 1/F (x), precisely the one that was found in the preceding paragraph to become
singular at the point of vanishing profits, or more explicitly, at the point where pF (x(w, p)) − x(w, p) ·w vanishes.
Therefore what goes wrong at this point, causing the rank reduction noted above, is the vanishing of the the Jacobian
determinant for the transformation from xi to ζi = x˜i. Therefore, as noted above, this phenomenon has nothing to
do with profits as such, a fact that can be illustrated by considering a profit maximizing firm whose operations entail
a fixed cost, i.e., a firm with the objective function f(x,a)
def
= pF (x)−x ·w−C, C > 0. Here, the catastrophe would
occur not at zero profits, but at the point where pF (x(w, p))−x(w, p) ·w vanishes, which corresponds to a loss equal
to C.
The circumstance that a variety of CSM’s is implied by the underlying structure of a model–the local concavity of
the production function being the relevant property here–is a most desirable one, especially from the standpoint of
comparison with empirical data. The example given in Eq. (27) et seq. is a case in point, since it demonstrates how
the available variety of CSM’s can be explored for the purpose of finding the most incisive implications of a given
model for confrontation with measured data.
The last case to be considered in this section is a constrained variant of the multi-output profit maximization model
briefly considered above. This model, which has received some attention recently in connection with the behavior of
U.S. agricultural producers, is defined by
max x s[p · F(x)− x ·w] s.t. C − x ·w = 0, (32)
where, as before, the auxiliary parameter s > 0 will eventually be set equal to unity. We shall refer to this problem
as the cost-constrained profit maximization model; clearly, its objective is to maximize profits subject to a prescribed
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total cost. As in the unconstrained version of this model, there are M input factors and G output products. We shall
take the parameter set to be the (M +G+ 2)-dimensional vector a
def
= (w,p, C, s).
Remarkably, Eq. (32) can be reinterpreted as a utility maximization problem, a fact that appears to have escaped
notice in the literature. To bring out this analogy, let us first note that it is simpler to deal with the equivalent
objective function sp ·F(x) by using the cost constraint to replace the second term sx ·w with sC, and then dropping
it altogether since it is free of decision variables. The formal analogy to the basic utility maximization problem is
now evident in the transformed optimization problem max x sp ·F(x) s.t. C − x ·w = 0, with sp ·F(x) playing the
role of the utility function and C representing the income term. In spite of this formal analogy, we will continue to
analyze this problem since it will lead to certain novel observations in addition to illustrating the results of §II.
It is convenient to start the analysis of this problem by exploiting its symmetries in accordance with Theorem
2-(ii). We do this by choosing J(x,a)
def
= b1
∑G
r=1pr(∂/∂pr) + b2(
∑M
r=1wr∂/∂wr + C∂/∂C), where b1 and b2 are an
arbitrary pair of real numbers. This equation in effect defines the pair of functions X and A introduced in connection
with the treatment of symmetries in §IIB. With this choice, the conditions of Theorem 2-(ii) are satisfied (assuming a
definite Hessian for F at the maximum point), and we have the conclusion that J(x,a)x(w,p, C) = 0. Choosing first
b1 6= 0, b2 = 0, then b1 = 0, b2 6= 0, we find from the invariance result (via Euler’s Theorem) two separate homogeneity
results as follows:
Property (x) The demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in the output prices, and, inde-
pendently, in the set (w, C) as well.
Note that these separate scale invariance properties constitute a stronger condition than a joint one involving all
the parameters. In particular, for G = 1, the above homogeneity property in the (single) output price implies a rather
surprising result which we state as
Property (xi) In case of a single output, the demand and supply functions are independent of the output price p.
In other words, the production decisions of a cost-constrained, profit-maximizing firm producing a single output
are insensitive to changes in the output price.
Continuing with the analysis of the model, we turn to the construction of the GCD’s. This is conveniently done
by the method of one term compensation using s and C for compensation on the objective and constraint functions
respectively. In this manner we find Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂/∂wα + xα∂/∂C for α = 1, . . . ,M , and Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂/∂pα −
[Fα/p · F(x)]s∂/∂s for α = M + 1, . . . ,M + G. Using these derivatives, we can proceed to the construction of the
CSM according to Eq. (7). After some straightforward algebra including the use of the constraint, and upon setting
s = 1, we find that the matrix [−λ[Wµν + xν(a)∂xµ(a)/∂C] −λM
[Qrν + xν(a)∂Fr(x(a))/∂C] P
]
(33)
is positive semidefinite. Here the matrices W,M,P,Q are the same as those introduced in connection with the multi-
output profit maximization model, with their orders specified according to µ, ν = 1, 2, . . . ,M and r, s = 1, 2, . . . , G.
Furthermore, λ
def
= w−1µ ∂[p · F(x(a))]/∂xµ > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier which may be interpreted as the marginal
profitability of expenditure, i.e., the increase in maximized profits due to a marginal increase in allowable expenditures
C. The full CSM given above is of order M +G, but it has a smaller rank. To see this, we appeal to Theorem 2-(iii)
which states that the rank of the above CSM is at most equal to the smaller of M − 1 and M +G. Since G ≥ 1, we
conclude that the CSM has a rank no larger than M − 1 while its order is M +G, confirming the above assertion.
The comparative statics properties of this model are thus summarized in
Property (xii) The two M ×M and G×G matrices
−[∂xµ(w,p, C)/∂wν + xν(w,p, C)∂xµ(w,p, C)/∂C], ∂Fr(w,p, C)/∂ps
are positive semidefinite. Furthermore, we have the equality
λ(w,p, C)∂xµ(w,p, C)/∂ps = −[∂Fs(w,p, C)/∂wµ + xµ(w,p, C)∂Fs(w,p, C)/∂C].
The similarity of this model to the basic utility maximization problem is now evident in the first of these matrices,
which is in fact the analog of the Slutsky-Hicks substitution matrix.
This concludes the application of our methods to certain models of profit maximization.
B. Generalized Utility Maximization
In this section we shall be concerned with constrained optimization problems of the general form max x f(x,b) s.t. g
k(x,b′) =
0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, where b and b′, the parameters of interest for comparative statics information, are separated into
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two sets, one occurring in the objective function and the other in the constraints. We shall refer to this category as
generalized utility maximization problems, reserving the label “utility maximization problem” for those cases where
the parameters of interest for comparative statics information appear only in the constraint functions. Thus the latter
assume the familiar structure
max x U(x) s.t. g
k(x,a) = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
We shall start our discussion with the best-known example of this class, the Slutsky-Hicks problem, and continue with
a sequence of generalizations toward more general forms, as well as applications to illustrate these.
In §IIA we constructed a set of GCD’s for the budget constraint that appears in the Slutsky-Hicks problem, the
basic utility maximization model. This model is defined by
max x U(x) s.t. m− p · x = 0, (34)
where U is a (quasi-concave, strongly monotonic) utility function. The parameter set is a
def
= (p,m), N = M + 1 in
number. Using the construction mentioned above, we find the well known result that (i) the Slutsky matrix
Σµν
def
= ∂xµ(p,m)/∂pν + xν(p,m)∂xµ(p,m)/∂m (35)
is negative semidefinite. Moreover, as an illustration of Theorem 2-(ii), we showed in §IIB that (ii) the demand
functions are homogeneous of degree zero in the parameters (p,m).
Recall that in our discussion of the various degrees of arbitrariness in the construction of CSM’s in §IIB and IIIA,
we deferred a more detailed consideration of the selection and number of decision variables and parameters to the
present section. We emphasized in our earlier discussions, particularly in connection with Theorem 2-(v), that while
one ordinarily chooses certain decision variables and parameters as the “natural” or “relevant” ones to use for a given
problem, such a choice is, at least mathematically, only one among an infinite family of possible complexions. Here,
using the Slutsky-Hicks problem as an example, we will implement a contraction in parameter space followed by one
in decision space to illustrate and amplify a number of points mentioned earlier.
We have already stated that redundant comparative statics descriptions (for which the CSM is less than full rank)
are common, as well as useful, in economic applications. In such cases, the CSM may be contracted to lower dimensions
without any loss of comparative statics information (in the sense that the original CSM can be reconstructed from
the reduced one). For the Slutsky-Hicks problem under discussion, Theorem 2-(iii) implies that the Slutsky matrix Σ
cannot have a rank larger than M − 1. Therefore, it should be possible to convey the comparative statics information
contained in Σ by means of a reduced, (M − 1)× (M − 1) matrix. In the following, we will implement this reduction,
in part to see whether there is any advantage to doing so.
As a preliminary step to reducing Σ, let us eliminate the income effect terms in favor of the price effect terms by
using the homogeneity condition of Property (ii) above. The result is Σµν =
∑M
γ=1[∂xµ(p,m)/∂pγ ](δγν − pγxν/m).
In effect, we have factored the Slutsky matrix into the product form Σ
def
= MΥ, where M and Υ can be identified by
reference to the subscripted form of the equation. Now one can easily verify that the price vector p is a null vector
for Υ, i.e., Υp = 0, as a direct consequence of the budget constraint. One can also verify that Υ is idempotent, i.e.,
that Υ2 = Υ, so that ΣΥ = Σ. Furthermore, since Σ is symmetric, one can reexpress it as Σ† = Σ = Υ†M†, and use
idempotency to modify the latter to read Σ = Υ†M†Υ. Finally, by a trivial change of parameters from p to p˜ def= p/m,
and another trivial change from Σ to Σ˜
def
= mΣ, we can eliminate any reference to the parameter m in the resulting
CSM;
Σ˜µν(p˜)
def
=
∑M
τ,ρ=1
[δµτ − xµp˜)p˜τ ]∂xρ(p˜)/∂p˜τ [δρν − p˜ρxν(p˜)]. (36)
Clearly, this matrix is negative semidefinite, and it is fully equivalent to the original Slutsky matrix in information
content by virtue of the budget constraint 1− x · p˜ = 0. We now have a description in terms of a reduced parameter
set p˜, with the homogeneity information implicit in the fact that the decision functions depend on prices and income
through the ratio p/m. Note also that the singular nature of the Slutsky matrix, Σ˜ · p˜ = p˜ · Σ˜ = 0, is manifest in
the new description. These mathematical niceties notwithstanding, it is obvious that Σ˜ is not amenable to a clear
economic interpretation; the precious intuition afforded by the original Slutsky matrix has been disguised in the new
representation.
The second step in the reduction relies on the fact that Σ˜ is singular, and as mentioned above, redundant. To
see how singularity implies redundancy, note that the row and column vectors of a square, singular matrix must be
linearly dependent, so that one or more of these vectors may be expressed in terms of the others. Therefore, as
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stated earlier, the dependent rows and columns may be dropped with no loss of generality. In our example, any
(M − 1)× (M − 1) submatrix of Σ˜ would still convey the information contained in the full matrix. We can therefore
drop, e.g., the last row and column of Σ˜, thus arriving at a CSM in terms of a reduced parameter set and with a
rank which is consistent with Theorem 2-(iii). In general, this is the most economical description of the comparative
statics of the Slutsky-Hicks problem. But it is certainly not the most cogent statement of the economics of that
model. Indeed the redundant Slutsky matrix expressed as a function of a redundant set of parameters, as in Eq. (35),
provides a much better intuitive understanding of the economics than the upper-left block of Σ˜. There is obviously no
expository advantage in adopting the reduced description in this case. On the other hand, it is entirely conceivable
that the form given in Eq. (36), or the fully reduced description just discussed, will provide more suitable alternatives
for comparison with measured data and empirical tests of the underlying model.
Having discussed the basic utility model in some detail, we now proceed to a number of generalizations whereby
the single linear constraint of Eq. (34) is replaced with multiple constraints, linear and nonlinear. As a preliminary to
considering an arbitrary number of linear constraint equations, it is convenient to first analyze the case of two such
equations. The model in question then reads
max x U(x) s.t. m
1 − p1 · x = 0 and m2 − p2 · x = 0, (37)
where, in order to avoid trivialities, we will take the two price vectors to be nonparallel. The construction of the
CSM for this model parallels the treatment of the basic model except for the doubling of the parameter set here to
a
def
= (p1,m1,p2,m2), for a total of N = 2(M + 1) parameters. Note that a given parameter only appears in one of
the constraint equations. Consequently, the GCD’s, also double as many as before, have the same basic structure as
before. They are given by Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂∂p1α
+ xα
∂
∂m1 for α = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and by Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂
∂p2α−M
+ xα−M ∂∂m2 for
α = M + 1,M + 2, . . . , 2M . It is useful to note at this point that according to the rank inequality formula of Theorem
2-(iii) the 2M × 2M CSM for this problem will have a rank no larger than min(M − 2, 2M) = M − 2. We therefore
anticipate a highly redundant CSM for this problem.
Returning to the construction of the CSM, we find by a straightforward application of Eq. (7) that it takes the
“double-Slutsky” form [
λ1Σ
1 λ1Σ
2
λ2Σ
1 λ2Σ
2
]
,
where Σ1µν
def
= ∂xµ(a)/∂p
1
ν + xν(a)∂xµ(a)/∂m
1, Σ2µν
def
= ∂xµ(a)/∂p
2
ν + xν(a)∂xµ(a)/∂m
2, µ, ν = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and λ1
and λ2 are (positive) Lagrange multipliers associated with the two constraint equations respectively. Since the full
CSM must be negative semidefinite, the same must be true of its diagonal blocks, Σ1 and Σ2. Adding the symmetry
condition, which requires one off-diagonal matrix to be the transpose of the other, we arrive at the following structure
for the CSM:
λ−11
[
λ1
2Σ1 λ1λ2Σ
1
λ2λ1Σ
1 λ2
2Σ1
]
. (38)
The high redundancy of this matrix is now fully manifest, since its rank is at most equal to that of its building block,
Σ1. Moreover, since this building block itself must obey the two (independent) constraint conditions
∑M
µ=1p
1
µΣ
1
µν =∑M
µ=1p
2
µΣ
1
µν = 0, its rank cannot exceed M − 2, implying the same for the full CSM. This conclusion confirms our
earlier rank determination for the CSM on the basis of Theorem 2-(iii).
The generalization of the two-constraint model of Eq. (37) to the K-constraint case,
max x U(x) s.t. m
k − pk · x = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ≤M, (39)
is straightforward and closely parallels the above development. Accordingly, the resulting CSM is a simple extension
of the block form found above, as follows:
Property (iii) The CSM for the multiple-constraint utility maximization model assumes a K ×K block form with
the (ij)th block equal to (λiλj/λ1)Σ
1.
The basic block Σ1, and consequently full CSM as well, must now obey K (independent) constraint equations∑M
µ=1p
k
µΣ
1
µν = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Consequently, the rank of the basic block Σ
1 cannot exceed M − K, with the
same implied for the full CSM. Clearly, each added constraint lowers the rank of the CSM by adding a new zero
to its spectrum while in general reducing the optimized utility level. As the number of constraints approaches the
dimension of the consumption bundle, i.e., as K →M , the optimization process becomes progressively less relevant in
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determining the chosen bundle, while, correspondingly, the CSM loses rank and information, until it finally vanishes
altogether at K = M .
The next step in generalizing the basic utility maximization model is the extension to nonlinear constraints. This
problem has received considerable attention in the literature, as it represents a first step in generalizing the prototype
constrained optimization problem. Indeed as stated in the Introduction, Hatta’s (1980) gain method was essentially
constructed to deal with (the multiple-constraint version of) this generalization and represents the first successful
treatment of this problem. In the following we shall deal with this generalization (and its multiple-constraint version)
according to our general procedure, and subsequently illustrate it by a model of consumer market power.
The generalization in question consists in replacing the linear constraint of Eq. (34) with B − E(x,b) = 0, where
E(·) is a twice continuously differentiable function, and b is an L-dimensional vector of parameters. With no loss in
generality, we can assume B to be nonnegative. The parameter set is thus identified as a
def
= (b, B), of dimension
N = L+1. Carrying out a procedure parallel to that followed in §IIA and above for the construction of the GCD’s, we
are led to Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂∂bα + [∂E(x,b)/∂bα]
∂
∂B , α = 1, 2, . . . , L. Substituting these in Eq. (7), we find the nonlinear
generalization of the Slutsky matrix (defined to be the negative of Ω divided by the Lagrange multiplier) in the form
Θαβ
def
=
∑M
i=1
[∂E,i(x(b, B),b)/∂bα][∂xi(b, B)/∂bβ + E,β(x(b, B),b)∂xi(b, B)/∂B]. (40)
This matrix is negative semidefinite, and has a rank not exceeding the smaller of M − 1 and L according to Theorem
2-(iii).
As a first application, let us consider a consumer who, competing in a small market where individual consumers
have market power, acts to maximize her utility on the basis of her best estimate of other consumers’ aggregate
demand (which she takes as fixed). Specifically, the model is defined by
max x U(x) s.t. m−
∑M
i=1
xiPi(xi + q
−
i ) = 0. (41)
Here Pi(·) is the (twice continuously differentiable) inverse supply function for the ith good and q−i is the aggregate
demand of all the other consumers for that good. The consumer is thus confronted with a nonlinear version of the
Slutsky-Hicks problem treated above, with B = m, and b = q−.
Assuming as usual the existence of a solution x(q−,m), we can directly proceed to the comparative statics of this
model using Eq. (40). Upon multiplying the result by 1/p′α on the left and 1/p
′
β on the right, we find
Gαβ
def
= [1 + xα(q
−,m)p′′α/p
′
α][
∂xα(q
−,m)
∂q−β
1
p′β
+
∂xα(q
−,m)
∂m
xβ(q
−,m)], (42)
where pα
def
= Pα(xα(q
−,m)+q−α ), and p
′
α and p
′′
α are respectively the first and second derivatives of Pα(xα(q
−,m)+q−α )
with respect to its argument. Thus G is negative semidefinite and has a rank not exceeding M − 1.
At this point, one can proceed to a consideration of the Nash equilibrium and associated comparative statics among
the consumers competing in the market described above. We will not pursue equilibrium considerations here, focusing
our attention instead on the implications of Eq. (42) for consumer behavior under conditions of imperfect competition.
For that purpose, however, Eq. (42) must first be rewritten in terms of p, the price vector. The change of parameters
from (q−,m) to (p,m) can be implemented by recourse to Theorem 2-(v) (or by means of the chain rule). The result
is
G˜αβ=
∑M
γ=1
Σαγ [1 + xγ(p,m)p
′′
γ/p
′
γ ]
−1
Jγβ , (43)
where Σαγ is the standard Slutsky form
∂xα(p,m)
∂pγ
+ ∂xα(p,m)∂m xγ(p,m) and Jγβ
def
= δγβ − p′γ ∂xβ(p,m)∂pγ . Furthermore,
we have introduced in Eq. (43) a modified CSM G˜ by pre- and post-multiplying G according to Theorem 2-(iv) and
Eq. (10) using [1 + xγ(p,m)p
′′
γ/p
′
γ ]
−1
and J† as factors. We have in Eq. (43) a generalization of the Slutsky matrix to
the case where the consumer has market power and full information (of the existing demand levels and inverse supply
functions, as stipulated above).
The first point to observe is that the limit p′ → 0 represents the case of perfect competition, since it removes all
possible price variations and market power effects. Thus we expect G to reduce to the standard Slutsky matrix Σ in
that limit, a fact which is readily verified by an inspection of Eq. (43). Next, we limit the remainder of this discussion
to the case of linear supply functions in order to simplify the analysis. In that case, p′ is a constant vector while p′′
vanishes. Thus Eq. (43) reduces to
G˜αβ=Σαβ −
∑M
γ=1
Σαγp
′
γ
∂xβ(p,m)
∂pγ
. (44)
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This form of the CSM for our model shows the effect of market power as a modification to the Slutsky form. The
second contribution in Eq. (44) is the market power term and has an intuitively appealing interpretation. To see this
interpretation, let DEMβγ
def
= (pγ/xβ)
∂xβ
∂pγ
represent the price elasticity matrix of consumer’s demand, and SUPγ
def
=
pγ/[(xγ + q
−
γ )p
′
γ ] be the elasticity of supply for the γth good. With these definitions, Eq. (44) can be written in the
form
G˜αβ=
∑M
γ=1
Σαγ [δγβ − xγ
xγ + q
−
γ
xβ
xγ
DEMβγ
SUPγ
]. (45)
It is now clear that the correction term is scaled by the quantity of consumer’s demand as a fraction of the aggregate
demand, and otherwise involves the ratio of the consumer’s demand elasticity to the market’s supply elasticity as well
as a geometrical factor. This is of course the sort of result one would expect, and it clearly shows how the consumer’s
market power is scaled by her share of the total demand.
Although we derived the above result assuming linear supply functions, it is also valid in cases of “weak” market
power, i.e., when xip
′
i/pi  1 (and the second-order derivatives of the inverse supply functions are negligible). For
such cases, Eq. (45) gives the small, leading correction to the Slutsky matrix arising from the consumer’s market
power. It must be pointed out here that while Σ is identical in form to the Slutsky matrix associated with a linear
budget constraint, it is nevertheless different from the latter on account of the nonlinear constraint in the present
instance. Indeed while G˜ is symmetric and obeys G˜p = p†G˜ = 0, Σ is not symmetric, and obeys p†Σ = Σp˜ = 0,
where p˜α = pα + p
′
αxα. Moreover, the simple homogeneity condition stated as Property (ii) above is no longer
valid here. What replaces it is a modified Euler condition in the form m˜∂xµ/∂m +
∑M
ν=1p˜ν∂xµ/∂pν = 0, where
m˜ = m+
∑M
α=1xα
2p′α. Note that all terms representing modifications to the basic utility maximization model involve
a factor of p′α and represent adjustments necessitated by the presence of market power effects. In summary, we have
Property (iv) The model of consumer demand with market power defined in Eq. (41) leads to a CSM with a
modified Slutsky structure as given in Eqs. (42)-(45). The term arising from the consumer’s market power is scaled
by her fraction of the total demand.
Our final step in generalizing the utility maximization problem is an extension of the single nonlinear case to that
of K nonlinear constraints. Thus we consider the constraint equations Bk − Ek(x,b) = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, K < M ,
where Ek(·) are a set of twice continuously differentiable functions. With no loss in generality, we can assume the
K parameters Bk to be nonnegative. The parameter set is thus identified as a
def
= (b,B), of dimension N = L + K.
A procedure closely parallel to that followed above leads us to Dα(x,a)
def
= ∂∂bα +
∑K
k=1[∂E
k(x,b)/∂bα]
∂
∂Bk
, α =
1, 2, . . . , L. Substituting these in Eq. (7), we find the nonlinear, multiple constraint generalization of the Slutsky
matrix (defined to be the negative of Ω) in the form
Ψαβ
def
=
∑M
i=1
[
∑K
k=1
λk∂E
k
,i(x(b,B),b)/∂bα]
×[∂xi(b,B)/∂bβ +
∑K
k=1
Ek,β(x(b,B),b)∂xi(b,B)/∂B
k], (46)
where λk are Lagrange multipliers as in Eq. (7). This matrix is negative semidefinite, and has a rank no larger than
the smaller of M −K and L according to Theorem 2-(iii).
This concludes our treatment of a series of progressively more general constrained optimization problems as exten-
sions of the basic utility maximization model. For the remainder of this section, we shall illustrate the above results
with two specific models, both of which involve uncertainty. Such models typically involve constraints originating
from the fact that the probability set has unit measure. When expressed in direct form, i.e., that the sum of all
probabilities equals unity, such conditions constrain the parameters but not the decision variables, and therefore do
not qualify as constraints in the usual sense (e.g., they do not conform to the constraint qualification condition in
decision space). Indeed they play no role in determining the solution to the optimization problem. However, if one
is interested in comparative statics information involving the probability set, i.e., if the probability set is in fact
included among the parameters of interest, then there arises the question of how the constraint is to be implemented
in parameter space. We will see in the following application that there is a natural method of implementing such
constraints which maintains the intrinsic symmetries of the problem.
Our first model here is thus an illustration of Eq. (46) dealing with multiple nonlinear constraints, as well as of
our method of treating problems which involve uncertainty and probability sets. This model is the principal-agent
problem with hidden actions, already encountered in §IIA, where a firm, the principal, intends to hire an individual,
the agent, to work on a specific venture on a contractual basis (see, e.g., Mas-Collel et al. 1995). The principal’s
objective in this venture is to maximize profits, while the agent is characterized as a utility maximizer with a known
utility function. However, the eventual outcome of the venture, including the realized profit and utility levels, are
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uncertain for two reasons. First, the effort level of the agent, which in our problem can take one of two possible
values high and low, is unknown and unobservable to the principal, even after the venture is completed and profits
are realized. On the other hand, this effort level is decided by the agent through expected utility maximization, hence
the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. Second, the venture’s profits are random and
unpredictable. They are specified stochastically according to a probability distribution which we take to be discrete
for simplicity. As already stipulated, the realized profit level, which is observable to both sides, does not reveal the
agent’s effort level; in other words, any realizable profit level can result from either effort level of the agent. The
principal’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes the firm’s expected profits. Since the agent’s effort level is a
choice variable in the principal’s profit maximization problem, the latter can be formulated as a pair of maximization
problems, one for each effort level, and the optimum decided by comparing the results.
The basic problem then is to maximize the principal’s expected profits, assuming a given effort level for the agent.
Accordingly, it can be formulated as follows:
max x
∑M
i=1
(pii − xi)PIi s.t.
∑M
i=1
v(xi)PIi − cI ≥ u¯,∑M
i=1
v(xi)PIi − cI ≥
∑M
i=1
v(xi)PIIi − cII ,
∑M
i=1
Pki = 1, k = I, II. (47)
Here Pki , where 0 < Pki < 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , k = I, II, is the probability of profit level pii given the effort level k,
with I and II corresponding to high and low effort, respectively. The decision variable xi, on the other hand, is the
agent’s compensation in case the ith profit level is realized, so that the vector x specifies the compensation schedule
and in effect defines the contract. The agent’s utility function is of the separable variety v(x)− ck, where x represents
the compensation and ck the disutility of working at effort level k. On the other hand, u¯ is the price of the agent’s
services (determined exogenously through competitive markets) in utility terms; it is often referred to as the agent’s
reservation utility level. Here we have assumed cI > cII , corresponding to the fact that the agent prefers low effort to
high effort, ceteris paribus. We have also assumed a high effort level (I) for the agent in Eq. (47), as is apparent from
the objective function and the second constraint in the above formulation. Once the optimum contracts for the above
problem and its conjugate, which is arrived at by interchanging I and II in Eq. (47), are determined, the principal
chooses the more profitable compensation schedule and offers the corresponding contract to the agent. We will assume
in the following that the principal finds k = I to be the more profitable choice, with no loss of generality. We will also
assume the utility function v(·) to be twice continuously differentiable, monotonically increasing and concave, and
moreover that there is a unique internal solution to the above maximization problem (and its conjugate). Furthermore,
we will assume that both inequality constraints bind, since an inequality that does not bind (i.e., one which is satisfied
as a strict inequality at the assumed solution) has no bearing on the comparative statics of the problem. It should
also be emphasized that the last pair of equations above only constrain the parameters and are not constraints in the
usual sense, a point that was discussed following Eq. (46).
Under the above-stated assumptions, the principal’s optimization problem can be rewritten as follows:
min x
∑M
i=1
xiPIi s.t. Bk −
∑M
i=1
v(xi)Pki = 0, sk −
∑M
i=1
Pki = 0, k = I, II, (48)
where Bk
def
= ck + u¯ and 0 < sk are a pair of auxiliary variables which will be set equal to unity at a convenient point
in the course of the analysis.
At this juncture we recognize that Eq. (48) is of the general nonlinear, multiple-constraint variety treated in
Eq. (46). This problem was also considered in §IIA, where we constructed a set of GCD’s by a two-term compensation
procedure based upon the GCD set for the basic utility maximization problem. The set thus obtained is Dα(x,a)
def
=
∂/∂PIα + v(xα)∂/∂BI + ∂/∂sI for α = 1, 2, . . . ,M and Dα(x,a) def= ∂/∂PIIα−M + v(xα−M )∂/∂BII + ∂/∂sII for
α = M + 1,M + 2, . . . , 2M . These definitions can conveniently be combined according to Dα(x,a)
def
= dIα for
α = 1, 2, . . . ,M and Dα(x,a)
def
= dIIα−M for α = M + 1,M + 2, . . . , 2M to obtain
dki =
∂
∂Pki
+ v(xi)
∂
∂Bk
+
∂
∂sk
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, k = I, II.
To proceed with the construction of the CSM, let us recall our earlier stipulation that a comparison of the maximized
profits for the two effort levels I and II by the principal has revealed the former to be optimal. To derive the
comparative statics information corresponding to this case, we substitute the GCD set derived above in Eq. (7) to
arrive at the desired CSM. The result is a negative semidefinite matrix which may be written in the block-matrix
form [
Φ11 Φ12
Φ21 Φ22
]
, (49)
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where Φkk
′
ij
def
= [2 − k − λkv′(xi)]dk′j xi(a), i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M and k, k′ = I, II, with the numerical assignments of
I
def
= 1 and II
def
= 2 understood here. Furthermore, v′(·) is the derivative of v(·) and λk is a Lagrange multiplier in the
foregoing expressions. It is also useful to record the first order conditions at this point:
PIi − λIPIi v′(xi)− λIIPIIi v′(xi) = 0.
We will use these conditions in the course of the analysis.
It is convenient at this point to eliminate the auxiliary parameters sI,II from our results. Since partial derivatives
with respect to these parameters occur only in terms of the form dkjxi in our expressions, they can be eliminated
by recourse to a certain scale symmetry of the underlying problem. This symmetry can be readily recognized by an
inspection of Eq. (48). To that end, observe that a rescaling of the (augmented) parameter set (a)
def
= (aI ,aII)
def
=
(PI , BI , sI ,PII , BII , sII) according to ak → µkak, where the scale constants µI,II are a pair of positive numbers,
leaves the problem unchanged. This invariance condition then implies, via Theorem 2-(ii), the following homogeneity
condition:
{
∑M
j=1
Pkj
∂
∂Pkj
+Bk
∂
∂Bk
+ sk
∂
∂sk
}x(a) = 0, k = I, II.
Using this homogeneity condition, one can eliminate all derivative terms with respect to the auxiliary parameters sk,
and then proceed to set them equal to unity. The result of this elimination is simply the replacement of the GCD set
dkj with
Dki def=
∂
∂Pki
−
∑M
j=1
Pkj
∂
∂Pkj
+ [v(xi)−Bk] ∂
∂Bk
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, k = I, II.
We pause at this point to underline the role played by the auxiliary parameters in dealing with the pair of constraints∑M
i=1PI,IIi = 1 in Eq. (48) which constrain its parameter space but not its decision space. In view of the fact that
these constraints do not allow a change in one of the probabilities while the others are kept fixed, a partial derivative
of the sort ∂x(a)/∂Pki does not correspond to a realizable scenario in the real world. On the other hand, one can
envision a change in a given probability with the compensating change required by the constraint symmetrically
allocated to all the probabilities. It is precisely this objective of enforcing the constraint in a symmetrical manner
that is accomplished by the introduction of the auxiliary parameters sI,II . The end result, which can be gleaned by an
inspection of the expression for Dki given above, is the replacement of the naive derivative ∂/∂Pki by the constraint-
conforming combination ∂/∂Pki −
∑M
j=1Pkj ∂/∂Pkj . Observe that the role played by the auxiliary variables here is
entirely analogous to that of Lagrange multipliers in a constrained optimization problem, the major distinction being
that the latter are used to enforce decision space constraints. Needless to say, the parameter constraints present here
are typical of any optimization problem which involves uncertainty and is defined in terms of random variables drawn
from probability sets. The method of auxiliary variables used here is thus a natural and effective way of dealing with
problems involving uncertainty.
Returning to the CSM derived above, we now proceed to exploit its symmetry properties. Thus considering the
2 × 2 block form of the CSM, we infer on the basis of its semidefiniteness that the diagonal blocks Φ11 and Φ22 are
symmetric, M ×M matrices, while Φ12 = Φ21†. The first and last of these conditions together with the first order
conditions given above may be used to infer the equality Φ22ij = RiΦ
11
ij Rj , while the remaining condition then implies
that Φ12ij = Φ
11
ij Rj , where 0 > Ri
def
= −PIi /PIIi . These relations lead to the “double-Slutsky” form already found for
the model defined in Eq. (37), namely [
Φ ΦR
RΦ RΦR
]
,
where Φ
def
= Φ11 and R is a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is Ri. This structure clearly implies that the
CSM is highly redundant, its rank being the same as that of each of its blocks, and since R is a negative definite
matrix, the properties of the full CSM are fully conveyed by the statement that Φ is a negative semidefinite matrix.
Note that this matrix is at most of rank M − 2, since the pair of (decision space) constraints in Eq. (48) imply the
existence of a pair of zero eigenvalues for it. Thus the rank of the full CSM is no larger than M − 2, which is precisely
what is predicted by Theorem 2-(iii).
To interpret the CSM just derived, let us first denote the minimized value of the objective function in Eq. (48) by
C(a). This is of course the principal’s minimum expected cost for inducing the agent to perform at effort level I. On
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the other hand, observe that since Bk
def
= ck + u¯, we have the envelope result that ∂C(a)/∂ck = λk, where we recall
that ck is the agent’s disutility for performing at effort level k. Therefore we find, not surprisingly in the light of
the basic utility maximization problem, that λk represents the expected marginal cost to the principal of the agent’s
disutility for working at effort level k. Recalling that cI > cII , and that the contract offered to the agent is intended
to induce level I performance, we can conclude that λI ≥ 0 while λII ≤ 0. A more detailed analysis involving the
first-order conditions and the constraints together with the properties of the agent’s value function confirms these
intuitive conclusions. Furthermore, since by assumption Pki > 0 as well as v′(xi) > 0 for k = I, II and i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
we may conclude, using the first order conditions, that 1− λIv′(xi) ≤ 0.
We are now in a position to state the comparative statics results for the principal-agent problem in a more useful
form. First, let us consider the negative semidefinite matrix Φ22ij = −λIIv′(xi)DIIj xi(a). Since λII ≤ 0, we have the
result that the M ×M matrix
Hij
def
=
∂v(xi(a))
∂PIIj
−
∑M
l=1
PIIl
∂v(xi(a))
∂PIIl
+ [v(xj(a))− cII − u¯]∂v(xi(a))
∂cII
(50)
is also negative semidefinite and has a rank no larger than M −2. Note that we have set ∂xj(a)/∂BII = ∂xj(a)/∂cII ,
an equality which can be ascertained by reference to Bk
def
= ck + u¯. Note also that we have stated the CSM in terms
of v′(xj(a)) rather than xj(a), a choice that simplifies the resulting expressions. The structural similarity of the
result in Eq. (50) to the Slutsky-Hicks result is quite evident. The extra terms here, on the other hand, result from
the appearance of the parameter constraints and the (generally nonlinear) function v(·) in the present problem. For
example, Eq. (50) implies that the appropriately compensated change in xi(a), the wages offered by the principal in
case profit level i is realized, as a result of an increase in PIIj , the probability of the jth profit level conditional on
effort level II, is negative. This is of course the expected response inasmuch as the principal’s objective is to induce
the agent to effort level I, hence away from effort level II.
The result in Eq. (50) can be equivalently stated in terms of level I parameters. To wit, the negative semidefinite
matrix Φ11 can be restated as
Φ11ij = [1− λlv′(xi(a))]DIjxi(a) = DIjxi(a)− λIDIj v(xi(a)), (51)
where DIj is the level I counterpart of the compensated derivative in Eq. (50). The full semidefiniteness results in Eqs.
(50) and (51) imply, among other things, the semidefiniteness of the respective diagonal elements, as summarized in
Property (v) The comparative statics properties of the principal-agent problem defined above are conveyed by the
negative semidefinite matrices Φ and H. In particular, we have the inequalities
∂xi(a)
∂PIi
−
∑M
j=1
PIj
∂xi(a)
∂PIj
+ [v(xi(a))− cI − u¯]∂xi(a)
∂cI
≥ 0,
∂xi(a)
∂PIIi
−
∑M
j=1
PIIj
∂xi(a)
∂PIIj
+ [v(xi(a))− cII − u¯]∂xi(a)
∂cII
≤ 0.
Note the sign reversal in going from level I derivatives to those of level II. Recalling that the contract was designed
to induce the agent to level I effort, one can comprehend the above inequalities as compensated adjustments in the
contract’s wage schedule, x, in response to changing expectations, P, which counteract any expected depreciation in
the level I prospects or appreciation in those of level II, while keeping costs as low as possible. As already emphasized,
the above analysis and its results pertain to the case where the contract is designed to induce effort level I. While
the analysis for the complementary case is parallel to the foregoing, the results are not expected to be symmetrical
with respect to an interchange of I and II, since the condition cI > cII breaks the symmetry between the two cases.
We conclude our discussion of the principal-agent problem by remarking that the formulation of this problem given
in Eq. (48) is formally identical to that of cost minimization subject to constraints, a fact that explains the observed
similarities to the Slutsky-Hicks problem.
Our final application deals with the problem of selecting an efficient portfolio from a set of M financial assets si
under idealized market conditions, including the possibility of a riskless asset and short sales. Treating returns as
random variables, the model seeks to find the portfolio which achieves a prescribed level of expected return with a
minimum variance. This problem is of the generalized utility maximization category defined earlier. It is defined by
(Fama and Miller 1972, Elton and Gruber 1991)
min x x
†σx s.t. W = w · x and R = r · x, (52)
where xi represents the fraction of the total investment allocated to asset si, σ stands for the covariance matrix of
the asset set, W def= 1 and wi def= 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , are auxiliary variables introduced for notational convenience,
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ri represents the expected rate of return for asset si, and R is the prescribed rate of return for the portfolio. The
possibility of short sales implies that the vector x is unrestricted in the sign and magnitude of its components.
The problem posed in Eq. (52) and variants of it have been extensively analyzed by various methods. Our objective
here is to derive and present the comparative statics information associated with it in a compact and useful manner.
As it stands, the formulation given in Eq. (52) leads to a highly redundant CSM. For example, the block containing
partial derivatives with respect to σij will be of order M(M + 1)/2 (the number of independent elements in the
covariance matrix) while its rank cannot exceed M − 2, which for a typical case with M  1 is far lower than its
order. The scenario underlying this difficulty, as well as its converse where the number of decision variables far exceeds
the number of parameters, is not uncommon and naturally arises in a number of problems. We will deal with this
difficulty by transforming Eq. (52) to a more suitable form which, it turns out, is quite useful in other respects as
well. The basic idea here is the simple observation that the entire analysis would be greatly simplified if the available
assets were in fact uncorrelated, i.e., if the covariance matrix were diagonal. Actual assets are of course significantly
correlated, but one can always construct certain mixes of them, to be called principal portfolios, that are entirely
uncorrelated. These special mixes are directly determined by the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix. In effect, the
problem of stock selection from existing, correlated assets is traded for the simpler problem of choosing from a set
of uncorrelated principal portfolios, which for all intents and purposes act as new assets themselves. Mathematically,
this transformation amounts to a simple change of basis from the initial assets to the principal portfolio basis where
the covariance matrix has a diagonal representation.
Let us now implement the above ideas. First, note that by virtue of its symmetry, σ admits of a set of M orthogonal
eigenvectors eµ, µ = 1, 2, . . . ,M . With no loss in generality, we will take these vectors to be of unit length, so that
eµ · eν = δµν . The covariance matrix itself can then be represented in terms of its eigenvalues and eigenvectors in the
form σij =
∑M
µ=1σ
2
µe
µ
i e
µ
j , where σ
2
µ ≥ 0 are the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix, or the principal variances. The
principal portfolios are now defined by Sµ
def
=
∑M
i=1e
µ
i si, i.e., the principal portfolio Sµ is a standard mix which contains
an amount eµi of asset si. Each principal portfolio is characterized by a weight Wµ
def
=
∑M
i=1e
µ
i wi, an expected rate
of return Rµ
def
=
∑M
i=1e
µ
i ri/Wµ, and a variance
∑M
j=1
∑M
i=1e
µ
i σije
µ
j = σ
2
µ, to be referred to as principal weight, return,
and variance, respectively. A general portfolio, initially specified by xi, is now described by Xµ, which determines
what share of the total investment is to be allocated to principal portfolio Sµ. These equivalent specifications are
related by the transformation equations xi =
∑M
µ=1e
µ
i Xµ and Xµ =
∑M
i=1e
µ
i xi. The pair of constraints W−w ·x = 0
and R−r ·x = 0, on the other hand, are transformed toW−W ·X = 0 and R−R ·X = 0. A riskless asset, if present,
would constitute a principal portfolio by itself, with vanishing variance, unit weight, and return equal to the riskless
rate of return. As is well known, the efficient portfolio in the presence of a riskless asset is a simple mix of the latter
and an efficient portfolio composed of the risky ones. Accordingly, we will treat the risky assets separately, excluding
riskless assets from consideration in the following. We will thus assume the principal variances to be positive definite,
since a principal portfolio with a vanishing principal variance is essentially equivalent to a riskless asset and can be
treated separately as stipulated.
The efficient portfolio is now defined by the optimization problem
min X
∑M
µ=1
σ2µXµ
2 s.t. W −W ·X = 0 and R−R ·X = 0, (53)
where σ2µ > 0. This is the principal-portfolio version of the problem posed in Eq. (52). The problem posed in Eq. (53),
on the other hand, can be solved in a straightforward manner. The solution is most conveniently expressed in terms
of the rescaled vectors W¯µ
def
= Wµ/σµ and R¯µ
def
= Rµ/σµ, where σµ is the positive square root of σ
2
µ. We find, in terms
of these rescaled vectors, the solution
Xµ( ~σ2,W,W,R,R) = [λ1(W¯,W, R¯,R)W¯µ + λ2(W¯,W, R¯,R)R¯µ]/2σµ, (54)
where λ1
def
= 2[R¯ · (WR¯−RW¯)]/D and λ2 def= −2[W¯ · (WR¯−RW¯)]/D with D def= (W¯ ·W¯)(R¯ ·R¯)− (W¯ · R¯)2, are the
pair of Lagrange multipliers associated with the two constraints in Eq. (53), and ~σ2
def
= (σ21 , . . . , σ
2
M ). On the other
hand, the minimized value of the objective function, to be called the portfolio variance and denoted by σ2P , is given
by the simple formula
σ2P (W¯,W, R¯,R) =
(WR¯−RW¯) · (WR¯−RW¯)
(W¯ · W¯)(R¯ · R¯)− (W¯ · R¯)2
(55)
The emergence of a quadratic dependence of σ2P on the portfolio return R, a well-known result of portfolio analysis,
should be noted. The minimum of σ2P with respect to R occurs at R? def= WW¯ · R¯/W¯ · W¯, and it simply equals
W2(W¯ · W¯)−1 =W2[∑Mµ=1(Wµ/σµ)2]−1, again a remarkably simple result. In summary, then, we have
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Property (vi) Eqs. (54) and (55) et seq. give a complete solution of the efficient portfolio problem by the method
of principal portfolios.
Returning to the comparative statics of the principal portfolio problem posed in Eq. (53), we note that this is a simple
extension of the problem posed in Eq. (37) thanks to the parameter separation between the objective and constraint
functions. This separation guarantees that the partial derivatives with respect to σ2µ are already in compensated form
with respect to the constraints. Hence we can take the GCD’s to be defined by Dα(X,a)
def
= ∂/∂σ2α for α = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
by Dα(X,a)
def
= ∂/∂Wα + Xα∂/∂W for α = M + 1,M + 2, . . . , 2M , and by Dα(X,a) def= ∂/∂Rα + Xα∂/∂R for
α = 2M + 1, 2M + 2, . . . , 3M . Using these in Eq. (7), one can derive the CSM in a straightforward manner. The
result is the 3× 3 block matrix  ∂Xµ2/∂σ2ν 2XµΣWµν 2XµΣRµν−λ1∂Xµ/∂σ2ν −λ1ΣWµν −λ1ΣRµν
−λ2∂Xµ/∂σ2ν −λ2ΣWµν −λ2ΣRµν
 , (56)
where ΣWµν
def
= ∂Xµ/∂Wν + Xν∂Xµ/∂W, ΣRµν def= ∂Xµ/∂Rν + Xν∂Xµ/∂R, with µ, ν = 1, 2, . . . ,M . The full matrix
in Eq. (56) is negative semidefinite, which implies that its diagonal blocks, ∂Xµ
2/∂σ2ν , −λ1ΣWµν , and −λ2ΣRµν are
also negative semidefinite. The symmetry property of the full matrix, on the other hand, implies that ∂Xµ
2/∂σ2ν =
−4XµΣWµνXν/λ1 = −4XµΣRµνXν/λ2. Finally, the constraints in Eq. (53) together with the symmetry of the CSM
imply that W and R are null vectors for the three matrices Xµ
−1(∂Xµ2/∂σ2ν)Xν
−1, ΣWµν , and Σ
R
µν . Therefore the
above 3M × 3M matrix is in fact redundant, with a rank no larger than M − 2. It is also evident by an inspection of
Eq. (53) that X( ~σ2,W,W,R,R) is homogeneous of order zero in the parameters ~σ2, (W¯,W), and (R¯,R) separately.
Thus the intuition associated with the Slutsky-Hicks problem can be brought to bear on the portfolio problem as
formulated in Eq. (53) in its entirety (albeit with a trivial reversal of signs). Note that the negative semidefiniteness of
∂Xµ
2/∂σ2ν implies that the portfolio variance is a concave function of the principal variances, a result that is evident
in Eq. (53) by inspection and may also be deduced from Eq. (53) by an application of the envelope relations. In
summary, then, we have
Property (vii)The comparative statics properties of the principal portfolio analysis are summarized in three
semidefinite matrices of order M and rank no larger than M − 2 as given in Eq. (56) et seq.
At this juncture the results of the principal portfolio analysis can be related to the original form. First, let us write
x( ~σ2,~e,w,W, r,R) =
∑M
µ=1
eµXµ( ~σ2,W,W,R,R), (57)
where ~e
def
= (e1, e2, . . . , eM ) is a vector of unit vectors. Note that we have replaced the covariance matrix by its
principal variance “vector” ~σ2 and the vector of its eigenvectors, ~e, among the arguments of x. One measure of the
progress achieved in going from x to X is the reduction in the number of arguments needed to describe these functions.
This number is of the order of M2/2, as can be estimated from Eq. (57). From a numerical point of view, the price
for this progress is the cost of computing the eigenquantities of the covariance matrix (a standard, albeit nontrivial,
task).
If desired, the comparative statics of the problem deduced above can be translated into the variables of the original
formulation using Eq. (57). It is important to realize, however, that except for the pair of Slutsky matrices, the clarity
and compactness of the above results will be obscured when stated in terms of the original variables. For this reason,
we will forgo a detailed calculation here and limit the discussion to a statement of the comparative statics information
with respect to (w,W) and (r,R). That information is already discernible from the original form in Eq. (52) by
analogy to the linear, multiple-constraint utility maximization model, and it can also be deduced from the matrices
ΣW and ΣR. In summary, we have
Property (vii) The Slutsky matrices λ1Σ
w and λ2Σ
r, where Σwij
def
= ∂xi/∂wj + xj∂xi/∂W and Σrij def= ∂xi/∂rj +
xj∂xi/∂R, are positive semidefinite and related by the equation λ2Σw = λ1Σr. Each has a rank no larger than
M − 2, and possesses two null vectors, w and r. Furthermore, x( ~σ2,~e,w,W, r,R) is homogeneous of order zero in
the parameters ~σ2, (w,W), and (r,R) separately.
Of course there is no direct interest attached to Σw since the parameters (w,W) are fixed by definition. We
conclude our discussion of the portfolio problem (with short sales allowed) by noting that the foregoing analysis has
amply confirmed our earlier statements that the principal portfolios are the natural variables for analyzing the efficient
portfolio problem. This is of course another instance of a golden rule in applied analysis that, where quadratic forms
are involved, a reformulation of the problem in terms of the principal axes is often quite advantageous.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objective of this work, namely the derivation of unrestricted comparative statics matrices for a general,
differentiable optimization problem, has been realized. The result, which is stated in Theorem 1, in effect completes the
program initiated and developed by Samuelson (1947), generalized and streamlined by Silberberg (1974), and further
advanced by Hatta (1980) and other authors, most of whom were mentioned in the introduction. We have primarily
established our results constructively, devoting considerable effort to explaining the details of the construction, as
well as to developing a clear, geometric picture of its workings. We have also developed a number of new results
and extensions, mainly summarized in Theorem 2 and the corollaries to Theorem 1, which further characterize the
properties of the CSM’s and thereby serve to broaden the power and reach of the analysis. In particular, the realization
that comparative statics results for a given problem can assume a wide range of shapes and forms significantly
strengthens their role in empirical comparisons and hypothesis testing, the primary raison d’eˆtre for a CSM.
In §IID we constructed a maximal, universal CSM for an arbitrary optimization problem, summarized in Theorem
3. For theoretical purposes, this theorem is an important basic result as it defines a framework in which any other
method must be subsumed. Not surprisingly, this universal method is not as practically convenient, or intuitively
appealing, as the method of generalized compensated derivatives used throughout this work. On the other hand,
recalling that the universal construction is applicable to any differentiable system governed by an extremum principle,
a category which includes numerous physical and mathematical problems in quite diverse fields of inquiry, one realizes
the vast scope and reach of this theorem.
Our applications cover a wide range from the very familiar to the novel, and are intended to illustrate the theorems
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the method. Remarkably, a surprising number of new and significant results have
emerged from these applications (as summarized in italicized paragraphs in §III), even in the case of very familiar
models. In choosing the applications, we have strived to illustrate our method by means of meaningful and interesting
economic models, avoiding excessively complex problems which, although more effective in demonstrating the power
of the formalism, would be lacking in clear economic meaning or intuitive sense.
Throughout, we have dealt with the comparative statics of a given, interior solution to an optimization problem. As
such, there is no need to deal with inequality constraints, since those that bind can be treated as equality constraints,
and those that don’t can be ignored altogether. Nor have we concerned ourselves with issues of integrability, since
these are primarily relevant to utility maximization problems of a particular structure. Similarly, although we have
not dealt with problems involving discrete-time, finite-horizon, intertemporal optimization, this and other categories
can be treated straightforwardly by our method.
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